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PUBLIC PENSION TRUSTEES'
PURSUIT OF SOCIAL GOALS
BEVERLY ROSS CAMPBELL
WILLIAM JOSEPHSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rising unemployment and declining inflation have reduced state
and local tax revenues' at the same time that federal resources avail-
able for state and local services and development are being cur-
tailed.2 This economic climate has prompted many proposals for
investing the burgeoning assets' of state and local government retire-
* Ms. Campbell and Mr. Josephson practice law in New York, New York. They
thank the trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System for permis-
sion to publish information gathered and ideas developed for the trustees; Mr. Jack R.
Meyer, Deputy Comptroller, Asset Management, and Joseph F. Moss, Esq., Counsel
for Finance to the Comptroller of The City of New York, for providing information
about the investment proposals examined in the fifth section of this article; and their
colleagues Frederick Lubcher, Benjamin Nassau and Mayer Siegel, Esqs., for their
critical comments on earlier versions of the paper. All opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the authors.
1. See, e.g., Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 8, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (Midwest ed.); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1982, at Al, col. 6; Am. Banker, July 28, 1982, at 42, col. 1; Daily Bond
Buyer, Jan. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at A1S, col. 1; Lindsey, Economy Worries
Officials of Cities, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1982, at A21, col. 1; Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1982,
at A1, col. 1; Teasdale, Cuts Threaten BOCES Classes, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, at
10, col. 5; Daily Bond Buyer, Sept. 18, 1981, at I, col. 4.
3. In 1975 state and local government pension fund investments exceeded $108
billion and were increasing by 13% annually. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDU-
CATION AND LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 48, app. 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT]. In 1979 the combined assets and reserves of
private and public pension funds amounted to approximately $650 billion, or almost
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ment systems to create housing, jobs, additional sources of funds for
mortgages and development loans and to otherwise benefit the local
community, state or region.
The current impetus to employ pension fund assets in ways that
promote the economic vitality of the communities in which partici-
pants in public pension funds live and work is only one aspect of a
larger movement to pursue multiple goals with pension fund assets
rather than to focus solely upon the ultimate payment of retirement
benefits.' Such divergent goals may include avoiding any investment
in entities that engage in activities deemed to be either immoral or
against the long-term interests of the pension fund participants, the
union that represents them or their employer. This desire has led to
efforts to achieve "clean portfolios" by excluding certain investments
from portfolios on the basis of nonfinancial criteria such as refusing
to finance activities of the government of South Africa or opposition
17% of all financial assets in the United States. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION
POLICY, FINAL REPORT, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT IN-
COME POLICY 18 (1981).
4. E.g., H. CAREY, BUILDING FROM STRENGTH: A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY (1982); E. COLTMAN & S. METZENBAUM, INVESTING IN
OURSELVES: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR Eco-
NOMIC IMPACT AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) (Report to the Task Force on
Public Pension Investments of the Massachusetts Social and Economic Opportunity
Council); GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, STATE OF NEW YORK,
INVESTING IN NEW YORK STATE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS (1981);
GOVERNOR'S PUBLIC INVESTMENT TASK FORCE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL RE-
PORT (1981); R. MESSINGER & MUN. RESEARCH INST., REVITALIZING NEW YORK
CITY'S ECONOMY: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS (Studies in Pension Fund
Investments No. 8) (1980).
5. Commentators have developed a number of terms to describe various nontradi-
tional investment approaches. The most common rubric used is "social investing,"
which describes investments that pursue broad social goals. "Targeted" investments,
a sub-category of so-called social investments, are those designed to benefit a target
community or geographical region, generally where the pension fund participants live
and work. Social investments that sacrifice some degree of safety or financial return,
elements expected from prudent investments, may be designated "concessionary" or
"subsidized" investments. In concessionary investments, part of the expected return
or desired safety has been relinquished in concession to the social goal. In subsidized
investments, other investments in the pension fund's portfolio that yield full prudent
returns subsidize these social investments. On the other hand, some investments in-
elude economic development potential or social benefit as a "bonus" in addition to
the safety and yield required under the prudent person standard. These may be
called nonconcessionary, nonsubsidized, or social bonus investments. All of these
terms are subsumed within "divergent investing," a term that describes any invest-
ment with goals diverging from the basic goal of providing retirement benefits to
participants and beneficiaries of the pension fund.
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to nonunion employers6 or competitors of the participants' employer.
Such criteria obviously reduce the range of potential investments for
the pension fund.7 On the other hand, goals that encompass addi-
tional positive benefits for the participants, their employer, or some
wider community often result in a search for new investment oppor-
tunities rather than a narrowing of the range of possible investments.8
Investment of public pension fund assets for purposes other than
the ultimate payment of retirement benefits departs from the tradi-
tional prudent person standard for the investment of trust funds.' In
addition, it often raises issues of fiduciary conflict of interests since
many public pension fund trustees are also government officials or
employees' representatives negotiating in the context of state and mu-
nicipal budgets. These trustees therefore have other interests in uses
of public pension funds that benefit the local or regional commu-
nity.'" Consequently, a rigorous examination of the legal standards
for investment of public pension fund assets is essential both to pro-
tect public pension fund participants and beneficiaries from potential
loss of retirement security and to help trustees avoid liability for vio-
lating their fiduciary duties.
This article examines the legal basis for public pension fund trust-
ees' consideration of goals that diverge from the direct financial bene-
fits of investment safety and return. It does so in the context of a
particular public pension system, the New York City Employees' Re-
tirement System (NYCERS) and investments designed to promote
economic development of a particular community or region.
NYCERS is one of the largest public pension systems for municipal
or state employees, indeed, one of the largest pension funds of any
6. For an analysis of the use of pension fund assets for capital boycotts as an
unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Re-
lations Act, see Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage, 34 RUTGERS L.
REv. 409, 434-49 (1982).
7. For discussion of the legal implications of "clean portfolios," see J. SIMON, C.
POWERS & J. GUNNERMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR 144 (1972); Reidhaar, Memoran-
dum:" The Legal Implications of University Investments in Companies Doing Business in
South Africa, 7 J.C. & U.L. 164 (1980-81); Note, University Investments with a South
African Connection: Is Prudent Divestiture Possible?, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
543 (1979).
8. See, e.g., L. LITVACK, PENSION FUNDS & ECONOMIC RENEWAL (Studies in De-
velopment Policy vol. 12) (1981); R. MESSINGER & MN. RESEARCH INST., supra note
4.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 23-35 & 243-95.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 146-71.
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kind, in the United States."' Much of the federal law applicable to
NYCERS also applies to other public pension funds. In addition, the
state and local statutes applicable to NYCERS are based, to a great
extent, on common law concepts that have been incorporated into
state and local legislation governing public pension funds in other
jurisdictions. Some applicable New York common law differs from
that governing public pension funds in other states, but most of the
common law concepts are comparable to those in sister states. Thus,
this examination of one specific retirement system should illustrate
the complex interrelationships among local, state and federal law
with which trustees of and counsel to public pension funds must be
concerned.
Numerous commentators and public officials have asserted in re-
cent years that under existing law pension fund trustees may take into
account all types of benefits to their funds, their participants and soci-
ety as a whole. These commentators argue that trustees may weigh
all these benefits when making investment decisions and not just the
traditional factors of return and safety.' 2 Current statutes and case
law provide little support for these arguments.' 3 A distinction should
be made here, however. Logically, pension fund trustees who have
determined from a position of loyalty to the participants and benefi-
ciaries that an investment satisfies the traditional criteria of prudence
should then be able to consider other benefits to the pension trust or
its participants, and then benefits to the governmental entity employ-
ing them or their community in deciding whether to make an invest-
11. NYCERS assets were valued at $7,298,068,762 as of November 30, 1982. Di-
vision of Investment Accounting of the Office of the Comptroller of The City of New
York. Cf. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
488 (1982).
12. Some commentators advocate applying the prudent person rule less strin-
gently to permit indirect financial benefits to the employee benefit trust to compensate
for somewhat lesser safety and/or return. See, e.g., Leibig, "You Can't Do That With
My Money"--A Search for Mandatory Social Responsibility in Pension Investments, 6
J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 358, 366 (1981); Ravikoff& Curzan, Social Respon-
sibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 526
n.28 (1980). Others also suggest that even general social benefits to the community
may counterbalance safety and return. See, e.g., 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 227.17 (3d ed. 1967) (Supp. 1981); E. COLTMAN & S. METZENBAUM, supra note 4, at
43.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 245-95. See also Murphy, Regulating Pub-
lic Employee Retirement Systemsfor Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REV. 211, 215-
27 (1982) (discusses economic case against "social welfare improvement" as goal for
public pension fund investments).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/4
PUBLIC PENSION TRUSTEES
ment. There is no judicial authority to the contrary."4 In other words,
in considering two prudent investments of equal financial merit,
trustees should be able to choose the investment offering the more
desirable indirect benefits to the pension fund or the greater benefit to
its participants' community.!5
Thus, the substantial legal issue raised by divergent investments is
whether benefits to the trust and its participants-as participants of
the fund, governmental employees or residents of the area-can jus-
tify pension fund investments that do not or may not satisfy tradi-
tional fiduciary standards of return on and safety of principal. We
conclude that, absent carefully crafted federal and state legislation,
such benefits do not supply the necessary justification under the cur-
rent state of the law.
In the second section of this article, the traditional investment stan-
dards of fiduciaries are reviewed briefly. 6 Then, the statutory frame-
14. Some commentators have concluded from the traditional articulation of the
prudent person rule that fiduciaries may not take into account any other factors once
return and safety are assured. See SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SO-
CIAL/POLITICAL PURPOSES: AN EBRI POLICY FORUM 8 (Salisbury ed. 1979);
Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 72, 96,
104 (1980).
15. See Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension As-
setsfor Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1340, 1346-47 (1980); Schot-
land, Should Pension Funds Be Used to Achieve 'Social Goals', TR. & EST. Sept. 1980,
at 10; Oct. 1980, at 27. Cf. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
Raymond Donovan, the Secretary of Labor, Jeffrey N. Clayton, the current Ad-
ministrator of the Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the Department
of Labor, Ian D. Lanoff, Clayton's predecessor, and James Hutchinson, the first ad-
ministrator of that office all believe that if a decision on a particular investment is a
prudent one and in the sole interest of participants and beneficiaries, the fact that it is
also socially desirable causes no problem under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. IV) [herein-
after cited as ERISA; citations are to the Act's section numbers as enacted rather
than to the United States Code]. Hutchinson & Cole, supra, at 1349, 1353-57; Lanoff,
The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under
ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387, 390 (1980); R. Donovan, Statement of the Secretary of
Labor before the Subcommittee on Labor, Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources 1 (Jan. 29, 1982). See Prudential Life Ins. Co., Dep't of Labor Op. Letter
(Jan. 16, 1981).
Cf Murphy, supra note 13, at 218 (no possible objection on economic grounds to
selection of financially comparable investments which produce gains for nonplan
participants).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 21-37.
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work applicable to NYCERS' investments is outlined.17 The fourth
section examines the statutes and relevant common law in detail in
order to derive an integrated approach to the issues.8 Next, several
representative investments, designed to achieve goals in addition to
securing retirement benefits which have been proposed for NYCERS,
are scrutinized in light of the preceding legal analysis." Finally, pos-
sible legislative solutions are examined for the issues raised in the
course of this article.20
II. TRADITONAL INVESTMENT CRITERIA
Traditionally, trustees have two basic investment duties-a duty to
invest prudently by maximizing return on and safety of the trust as-
sets and a duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of their
trust.2' Courts hold these duties to be inherent in legislatures' re-
peated use of such terms as "trust," "trustee," "fiduciary" and "bene-
ficiary" in the statutes governing public pension funds.22 Moreover,
local, state and federal statutes applicable to the investment decisions
of public pension fund trustees in one way or another incorporate
these two common law duties.
The duty of prudence was first articulated in 1830 by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachuetts in Harvard College v. Amory:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is
17. See infra text accompanying notes 38-125.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 126-361.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 362-76.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 377-409.
21. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
Professor Scott and Ravikoff and Curzan rely on analogies with investment powers
of corporate directors and trustees or directors of charitable trusts to support their
contention that trade-offs between safety or return and nonfinancial benefits are per-
missible for investments by public pension fund trustees; 3 A. Sco'rT, supra note 12,
§ 227.17 (Supp. 1980); Ravikoff& Curzan, supra note 12, at 536. These analogies are
inapposite because the standard of care applicable to directors of business and chari-
table corporations derives from the business judgment rule, not from the fiduciary
standard applicable to trusts established for particular beneficiaries. Ward, The Char-
itable Fiduciary Liability Question, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 3. 700, 709-13passim
(1982). In addition, the rationale that has generally protected corporate directors
from liability for acts of apparent corporate altruism is that the directors were actually
pursuing the longer-range financial interest of the corporation. Accord, Langbein &
Posner, supra note 14, at 100.
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to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested.23
This represented a relaxation of both the early English rule obligat-
ing a trustee to return to a grantor or beneficiary of a trust property
identical to that entrusted to him and the later rule obligating trustees
to make virtually risk-free investments.24
In 1869 the New York Court of Appeals enunciated its now classic
formulation of the "prudent person" rule. In King v. Talbot,25 it
stated that "the trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such
prudence in the care and management [of the trust], as in general,
prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in
their own like affairs."2 6 At the same time, the court departed from
the Massachusetts prudence standard by holding that the security of
the trust corpus and acquisition of a reasonable income must be the
trustee's paramount objectives, even if at the expense of capital ap-
preciation. 27 The authorities agree that New York courts apply a
somewhat stricter standard, one of a cautious prudent investor who is
more interested in preserving capital than in taking the risks neces-
sary for significant capital appreciation. 2 The trend, however, is to
adopt the Massachusetts rule.29
In New York and other jurisdictions following traditional common
law principles, a fiduciary must exercise the same prudence with re-
spect to each investment decision.30 The fact that the trust's portfolio
has increased substantially in total value during the period of time
under scrutiny will not insulate the fiduciary from responsibility for
imprudence in selecting or retaining particular investments for which
23. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
24. 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12, §§ 227.4, 227.5; E. COLTMAN & S. METZENBAUM,
supra note 4, at 41-43.
25. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
26. Id at 85.
27. Id See 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12, §§ 227.3, 227.6.
28. 3 A. ScoT, supra note 12, § 227.3 at 1812. See Mills v. Bluestein, 275 N.Y.
317, 325, 9 N.E.2d 944, 948 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
29. Id
30. In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364
N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974). See 3 A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 213.
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he may be surcharged.31
Prudence is a matter of conduct, not of investment performance.32
There is no inherent connection between a loss sustained on an in-
vestment and imprudence in the investment decision. If a fiduciary
has prudently chosen or retained an investment, he may not be held
liable for any loss sustained as a result of that investment decision.33
Conversely, it is possible for an imprudent investment to yield a
profit or gain for the trust. In such cases, the fiduciary has equally
breached his fiduciary obligations. There is simply no damage to the
trust beneficiaries. 34 Since prudence is a matter of the fiduciary's
conduct, his prudence should always be "tested at the time of the
investment decision, not from the vantage point of hindsight. 35
The trustee's duty of loyalty is the duty to act in the interest of the
trust, as if the trustee had no interests of his own to protect. The
trustee must resolve all conflicts which may exist between his per-
sonal or other interests and those of the trust and its beneficiaries in
favor of the latter36 and must treat all beneficiaries evenhandedly.37
III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
While the basic concepts involved in investments by pension fund
trustees derive from the common law of private trusts, these concepts
have been further developed and supplemented by legislative action.
Local, state and federal laws all contain requirements and restric-
tions, often overlapping, which must be considered by public pension
fund trustees.
A. The Plan
Unlike the more typical employer-adopted pension plans,
31. Id.
32. In re Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 89 Misc. 2d 1088, 1091, 396 N.Y.S.2d 781,784
(Sur. Ct. 1977). See also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1) (1982)
33. In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164
(1974); 3 A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 227.1.
34. Cf. ERISA §§ 409(a), 502(a). These sections appear to authorize injunctive
relief against trustees who have breached their fiduciary obligations, regardless of
whether specific losses have been incurred.
35. In re Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 89 Misc. 2d at 1091, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 784,
36. See infra text accompanying notes 128-38.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 214-17.
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NYCERS was established pursuant to statute. 38 The Administrative
Code of the City of New York provides for the administration of
NYCERS by a "board of trustees."39 This is repeated in a later sec-
tion of the Administrative Code, which provides that the members of
the board "shall be the trustees of the several funds provided for by
this title."4
Use of the traditional legal term "trustees" to describe the relation-
ship of the members of the board to the funds of NYCERS indicates
the legislature's intention to establish a traditional trustee relation-
ship between the members of the board and the participants and ben-
eficiaries of NYCERS.4 1 Legal authorities construing the obligations
of public employee pension systems have assumed that these obliga-
tions are governed by the principles of law developed with respect to
trustees of private trusts. 42
The NYCERS trustees have "full power to invest" the system's as-
sets43 subject to restrictions imposed by the Administrative Code and
other statutes. 4 The New York City Comptroller's statutory
designation as custodian of NYCERS' assets, subject to the control of
38. NEW YORK CrrY ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, tit. B (1976). Public pension funds that
are not established under detailed statutory plans have trust instruments or plans sim-
ilar to those under which private pension funds are established.
39. Id § B3-2.1.
40. Id § B3-22.0. Most public pension funds or systems are comprised of two or
more discrete trust funds. For example, NYCERS includes four separate trusts. Id.
§ B3-14.0. The requirements for "qualification" contained in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended, § 401(a) [hereinafter cited as IRC] must be satisfied by
each trust. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. In this article, it is assumed
that all trusts in a system either do or do not qualify under § 401(a), and the terms
"trust," "fund" and "system" are used interchangeably to denote an entire system of
trust funds for providing retirement benefits to a single group of employees.
41. See Savings Bank of New London v. New York Trust Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 963,
975 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (term "trustee" connotes trust, confidence, reliance and active
diligence). Cf. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (Congress' use of
such terms as "held in trust" and "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees
... and their families and dependents" necessarily implies Congress' intent to incor-
porate the law of trusts).
42. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1254
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd mer. 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979) (municipal pension fund
trustees are subject to the "prudent man rule" and are therefore obligated to preserve
trust corpus and procure reasonable income while avoiding undue risks); 1977 Op.
N.Y. Att'y Gen. 37, 38 (1977).
43. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-22.0 (1976).
44. N.Y. RETinE. & Soc. SEc. LAW §§ 177-79 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1981);
NEW YoRK CrrY ADMIN. CODE ff B3-22.0 (1976), E49-1.0, -3.0 (1975). See N.Y.
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the NYCERS trustees, 45 confirms their investment power. When the
Comptroller invests NYCERS' assets pursuant to the trustees' dele-
gation of authority, he is subject to the same limitations as their
agent.46
The only other local law applicable to the investment power of the
NYCERS trustees bars them from having any direct or indirect inter-
est in the gains or profits of the system's investments, borrowing or
using NYCERS' assets on behalf of themselves or any third party,
receiving any pay or emolument for their services, or guaranteeing or
insuring any loans to or from NYCERS.4 7
B. Investment Restrictions.- The Legal List
Both the Administrative Code of the City of New York48 and the
New York State Retirement and Social Security Law49 restrict the
NYCERS trustees' investment power by incorporating the list of per-
missible investments for savings banks in New York State.5" Provi-
sions in the Retirement and Social Security Law5 and the
Administrative Code further limit the trustees.52 The Retirement and
Social Security Law also specifically authorizes certain investments5 3
BANKING LAW §§ 235, 235-a (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1981). See also infra text ac-
companying notes 48-49.
45. NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-24.0 (1976).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 328-29.
47. NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-27.0 (1976).
48. Id § B3-22.0.
49. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177(1) (McKinney 1971).
50. N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 235, 235-a (McKinney 1971).
51. N.Y. RERE. & Soc. SFc. LAW § 177(1) (MeKinney 1971) (limitations on in-
vestments in conventional mortgages, obligations of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, Canadian obligations, equipment trust certificates
and obligations of railroads and public utilities); id § 177(2) (further limitations on
investments in equity securities authorized for investment by § 235 of the New York
Banking Law); id § 178 (limitations on investments in insured mortgages and con-
ventional mortgages).
52. NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § E49-1.0 (1975) (subject to certain condi-
tions, notes or bonds secured by purchase money mortgages accepted by the City at
the time it sells real property acquired in tax enforcement foreclosure proceedings);
id § E49-3.0 (railroad, industrial, electric and gas, telephone and waterworks
obligations).
53. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177(3) (McKinney 1971) (conventional
mortgages guaranteed by state banks of a certain size); id § 177(4) (obligations of
New York State banks secured by federally insured or guaranteed mortgages); Id
§ 177(5) (participation in conventional mortgages in which only specified kinds of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/4
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that would or might be impermissible under the list of permissible
savings bank investments.
Together, these statutes comprise the so-called "legal list" of in-
vestments in which the trustees have power or authority to invest.54
Although the legal list is couched in positive terms,55 in effect it re-
stricts the trustees from investing in certain types of securities and
other investments. 6 Ironically, the original purpose of the legal list
was to liberalize the scope of investments that trustees could consider.
Courts applying the prudent person standard of King v. Talbot57
tended to extrapolate from the imprudence of a specific investment
before another court the imprudence of all investments of that type.
The legislature developed the legal list to make clear to trustees and
courts that listed investment types were authorized for investment by
institutions participate); id § 177(6) (real property acquired for specified purposes
and in specified ways); id § 177-a (first mortgages on real property located anywhere
in United States); id § 177-c (investment grade mortgage pass-through certificates
secured by certain kinds of property); id § 179 (obligations of Municipal Assistance
Corporation for the City of New York).
54. In the past, "legal lists" have limited the investment authority of trustees in a
large number of states. Many have been repealed, however, in recent years. CON-
GRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194. Of the legal lists still in force
for public pension funds, New York's probably is the most complex in the United
States. HAMILTON, JOHNSTON & Co., REPORT TO NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 16 (1981). Cf. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 20205 (Deering 1982) (investments of California state retirement fund
are subject to the same conditions and restrictions imposed upon investments of sav-
ings banks, as well as special restrictions imposed solely upon state retirement fund).
55. Permissible investments on the legal list include, but are not limited to, obliga-
tions of the United States, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235, subd. 1 (McKinney 1971); obli-
gations of New York State, id § 235, subd. 2; obligations of New York City, id. § 235,
subd. 4; and obligations for which the full faith and credit of the United States, New
York State or New York City is pledged, id § 235, subd. 1-2, 4; N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2; bonds issued by electrical, natural gas and telephone utility companies in-
corporated in the United States, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235, subd. 13-15 (McKinney
1971); preferred stock of United States corporations as authorized by the New York
State Banking Board, id § 235, subd. 26(a); and any security specifically made eligi-
ble by the State Banking Board, id § 235, subd. 19.
56. Securities that are excluded de facto include:
(a) Securities of companies incorporated outside of the United States or Puerto
Rico; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235, subd. 26(a)-(c) (McKinney 1971);
(b) Securities not listed on a national securities exchange, id § 235, subd.
26(c)(1); and
(c) Securities of casualty and fire insurance companies that have senior securi-
ties outstanding or derive more than 55% of their premiums from fire and
motor vehicle risk, id § 253, subd. 26(d).
57. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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fiduciaries and that a given investment could be challenged solely on
the basis of its own particulars.5" Accordingly, the presence of a par-
ticular type of security or other investment on the legal list makes it
eligible for investment consideration, but it does not actually author-
ize the trustees or their properly designated agents to invest in a par-
ticular investment of that type. The trustees still may authorize only
prudent investments and must satisfy their duties to exercise care and
skill in selecting particular investments and to invest for the benefit of
NYCERS' participants and beneficiaries. 9
Trustees must closely review legal list investments that are coupled
with a guaranty or other additional security not contained on the le-
gal list. The relationship between investments of this type and the
safety required by the prudent person standard may be conceptual-
ized as a continuum. At one end would be investments that are au-
thorized by a provision of the legal list and that the trustees deem to
be clearly prudent. Any additional security for such an investment is
"icing on the cake." An example of this situation might be a loan to
a real property owner to upgrade a prime commercial property se-
cured by a mortgage on the property guaranteed by a state bank,6"
for which the trustees obtain standard performance bonds from the
contractors and subcontractors on the project. The performance
bonds are not required or authorized by the legal list, and probably
are not required in order for a fiduciary to find that the loan is pru-
dent. Yet the trustees might well desire the bonds as an additional
precaution.
At the other end of the continuum would be investments that, al-
though also on the legal list, are deemed by the trustees to be clearly
imprudent. However, the additional security is prudent, either alone
or in combination with the authorized investment, but not on the le-
gal list. An example might be a construction loan to build an office
building on swamp land. Independent engineering consultants as-
sure the trustees that current technology cannot provide an adequate
foundation for the buildings, but David Rockefeller executes his per-
58. See 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, § 227.3. Cf. Governor's Memorandum on ch.
817ofthe 1960. Y. Laws, NEw YopK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 548, 549 (1960).
59. Delafield v. Barrett, 270 N.Y. 43, 48, 200 N.E. 67, 69 (1936) (fiduciary who
invests in securities specified in statutes is not thereby freed from liability if he fails to
exercise reasonable judgment and discretion in making investments); In re Weinz'
Will, 65 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sur. Ct. 1946) (trustee surcharged for loss on legal but impru-
dent investment in a mortgage).
60. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEc. LAW § 177(3) (McKinney 1971).
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sonal guaranty of the timely repayment of the loan. The trustees
would not truly be investing in the developer's mortgage but in Rock-
efeller's credit, which is not on the legal list. In these circumstances it
would seem that the "package" of the construction loan plus the
guaranty should not be deemed to be a legal investment. 61
C. State Regulatory Review
The New York Insurance Law authorizes the Superintendent of
Insurance of New York State to promulgate standards for investment
policies and the discharge of fiduciary responsibilities with respect to
New York State and City public employee retirement systems.62 Such
standards have been promulgated as Part 136 of Title 11 of New
York Codes, Rules and Regulations (Insurance Regulations).63
The Insurance Regulations affirm that the NYCERS trustees are
61. This conceptualization is supported by the final regulations issued by the De-
partment of Labor on the definition of some plan assets under ERISA. In its Notice
promulgating the final regulations, the Department described several kinds of securi-
ties issued, guaranteed or insured by governmental and quasi-governmental entities
and backed by mortgage pools, including securities issued by the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA). 47 Fed. Reg. 21,241 (1982). The Department
concluded that in each case the securities represent beneficial ownership interests in
the underlying mortgages. It determined for several reasons, however, to exclude the
underlying mortgages from the definition of assets owned by pension trusts purchas-
ing the securities. One key reason for its determination was the Department's percep-
tion of the investment intent, which generally accompanies a pension trust's purchase
of governmental mortgage pool securities:
GNMA guaranteed pass-through mortgage certificates are guaranteed by the
United States, and where such a guarantee by the United States exists with re-
spect to a plan's investment in a mortgage pool, the Department believes that a
plan that invests in the pool will look to the guarantee, rather than to the mort-
gage underlying the pool, for assurance that amounts due on its investment will
be paid. Although FHLMC [Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation] and
FNMA [Federal National Mortgage Association] mortgage pool certificates are
not guaranteed directly or indirectly by the United States, each corporation guar-
antees principal and interest on such investments and, accordingly, an investing
plan will rely on the creditworthiness of the issuing corporation in making its
investment decision.
Id at 21,243. The Department concluded and the regulations provided that pension
fund investments in such securities should be treated as investments in securities
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States and not as investments in any
of the underlying mortgages. Id at 21,243; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.401b-16(a)(1). This con-
clusion is equivalent to finding that the governmental guarantee, or "additional secur-
ity," is the true investment, not the underlying mortgages.
62. N.Y. INs. LAw § 36-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
63. NYCRR tit. 11, § 136 (1978).
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fiduciaries and reiterate the prudent person rule as the basic standard
for the discharge of their fiduciary responsibilities.' In addition, the
Insurance Regulations provide that the trustees must act "solely in
the interests of the members and beneficiaries"65 of the pension fund,
a reformulation of the traditional duty of loyalty.66 They also con-
tain four prohibitions which further define the duty of loyalty owed
to the pension fund by its trustees, agents, consultants and
employees.67
Finally, the Insurance Regulations provide that a breach of fiduci-
64. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(a). Section 136.6(a) provides that "[t]he administrative
heads are fiduciaries . . . . They shall perform their responsibilities in a manner
consistent with those of a reasonably prudent person exercising care, skill and cau-
tion." Under § 136.2(b), "administrative head" means: "if not otherwise defined by
law, the board of trustees of a retirement system, in their individual and collective
capacities." "Administrative head" is not otherwise defined in any other statute ap-
plicable to NYCERS. The definition, by referring to the "individual and collective
capacities" of the trustees, appears also to incorporate the common law principle that
a trustee is responsible for all trustees' participation or failure to participate in the
administration of the trust. See In re Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311, 315 (Sur. Ct.
1954) (trustees owe their beneficiaries the duty of independent judgment); In re Pate's
Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 862 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (administration of a trust rests with
trustee and he may not delegate or abdicate that duty), aff'd, 276 A.D. 1008, 97
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1950); 2 A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 184 (a trustee is under a
duty not to delegate to third persons any acts that he can reasonably be required to
perform). Cf. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 10-10.7 (McKinney Supp. 1982) (a
joint power, other than a power of appointment, conferred upon three or more
fiduciaries, is exercisable by a majority of the fiduciaries unless contrary to the express
provisions of the trust). Moreover, under certain circumstances, a trustee is responsi-
ble for applying to the court to prevent a breach of trust by his co-trustee. See In re
Garland, 159 Misc. 333, 287 N.Y.S. 918 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (when will creating trust
named corporation and widow as co-trustees and trust committee of corporate trustee
had reached conclusion that bonds belonging to trust estate should be sold, corporate
trustee had duty to insist upon sale of bonds notwithstanding opposition of widow); 3
A. ScoTT, supra note 12, § 194 (when the circumstances are such that failure to exer-
cise a power is breach of trust and one of two trustees wishes to exercise the power but
the other refuses to concur, trustee wishing to exercise the power is duty bound to
apply to court for directions). Cf. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2261 (Deering 1981) (Board of
Administration of the California Public Employees' Retirement System must invest
consistently with duties of loyalty and prudence).
65. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(a).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 127-36.
67. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(h). Section 136.6(h) of the Insurance Regulations
provides:
The administrative head, and its consultants, agents and employees, shall not:
I) deal with the assets of a system for their own account;
2) act in any capacity in any transaction involving a system on behalf of a party
whose interests are adverse to a system or its members;
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ary responsibility results when a trustee or other agent of a pension
fund, subject to supervision by the Superintendent of Insurance,
wilfully violates or knowingly participates in a violation of the Insur-
ance Regulations or fails to implement any other applicable law.6 8
This provision directly incorporates the requirements specified in
other sections of the Insurance Regulations regarding accounting
practices, 69 supervision of delegated investment authority,7" report-
ing of investments and other administrative duties.7" It also gives the
Superintendent of Insurance the power to investigate and report to
the Attorney General possible violations of the Insurance Regula-
tions or any other statute applicable to the pension fund.7 2
D. Internal Revenue Code Requirements
Currently, the most important federal statute directly applicable to
the fiduciary aspects of investments of public pension funds is the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (IRC).7 3  Through its
provisions, Congress confers favorable tax treatment on public pen-
sion plan trusts and plan participants and beneficiaries when criteria
relating to employer function,74 purpose,75 funding,76 participation,77
3) receive any consideration from any party in connection with a transaction
involving a system's funds or its assets; or
4) own or maintain any indicia of ownership or personal interest in any assets
of a system other than an interest in the system as a member or beneficiary.
68. Id. § 136.9(a)-(b).
69. Id § 136.4.
70. Id. § 136.6(d).
71. Id § 136.6(c).
72. Id § 136.6(c). These statutes include the New York City Administrative
Code, the New York State Banking and Retirement and Social Security Laws and,
arguably, the Internal Revenue Code.
73. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1976). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sec-
tions of the IRC are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
74. IRC § 115 (1976).
75. Section 401(a) of the IRC provides, in pertinent part:
A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock
bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan of an employer/or the exclusive benefit of
his employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this
section-
1) if contributions are made to the trust by such employer, or employees, or
both, . .for the purpose of distributing to such employees or their beneficiaries the
corpus and income of thefund accumulated by the trust in accordance with such
plan;
2) if under the trust instrument it is impossible, at any time prior to the satis-
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
58 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:43
vesting,78 maximum benefits 79 and distribution of benefits80 are
satisfied.
Briefly, three major tax benefits may be accorded public employees
and their pension plans under the Internal Revenue Code:
(1) exemption from federal income taxation of pension fund
trusts' earnings;81
(2) deferred taxation of an employee on contributions to a plan
made on his behalf by his employer, even if the contributions are
vested and therefore ordinarily imputable to the employee for income
tax purposes;82 and
(3) favorable treatment of various kinds of distributions to plan
participants and beneficiaries.83
faction of all liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under
the trust, for any part of the corpus or income to be... used for or diverted to,
purposes other thanfor the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries
(emphasis added).
76. IRC § 401(a)(7) (as in effect Sept. 1, 1974). ERISA took effect September 1,
1974. Because governmental plans were excepted from the provisions amending re-
quirements of the IRC previously applicable to both public and private qualified pen-
sion plans, in effect those requirements were "frozen" for public plans as they were in
effect on September 1, 1974. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 291 (1974),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SE-
cuRITy ACT OF 1974, at 4558 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ERISA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
77. Id §§ 401(a)(4), 401(a)(5); IRC § 401(a)(3) (as in effect Sept. 1, 1974). See
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 76, at 4528.
78. IRC § 401(a)(7) (as in effect Sept. 1, 1974). See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
76, at 4534.
79. IRC § 415 (Supp. IV 1980).
80. Id §§401(a)(9), 401(a)(10), 401(a)(ll).
81. IRC § 501(a) (1976). This section provides that "[a]n organization described
in... Section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such
exemption is denied under section 502 or 503."
This tax benefit also may be independently available to a public pension trust by
reason of § 115 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that "[giross income
does not include-) income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any
essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision
thereof ... " See S. REP. No. 956, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.2 (1978). See also infra
text accompanying notes 85-92.
82. Id §§ 402(a)(1) (voluntary and involuntary nondeductible employee contri-
butions and employer contributions); 401(k), 402(a)(8) (amounts attributable to salary
reduction); 72(o)(1), 402(a)(1) (deductible employee contributions).
83. Id §§ 101(b) (favorable income tax treatment for death benefits paid from
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These tax benefits are substantial, and a fiduciary's approval of any
investment transaction that jeopardizes the tax benefits received by
the public pension fund's participants and beneficiaries would almost
certainly constitute breach of his fiduciary duty.84
It is unclear whether public pension funds must "qualify" by com-
plying with the provisions of IRC sections 401 and 415 in order to
receive the first benefit listed above, exemption of earnings on trust
assets. 85 Statutorily established public pension plans may be able to
claim exclusion of their ordinary income86 and capital gains87 from
qualified plans); 2039(c) (exclusion from estate taxes of annuity distributions to
named beneficiaries); 219(e)(2) (deductibility of voluntary employee contributions);
402(a)(2) (capital gains treatment of lump sum distributions to employees); 402(a)(5)
(deferral of taxation on lump sum distributions); 402(e) (10-year averaging of lump
sum distributions). Private pension plans may receive a fourth major benefit whereby
the employer's contributions to the plan are deductible when made, even if the em-
ployee's interest is not vested at that time. IRC § 404 (Supp. IV 1980). This benefit is
irrelevant for public pension plans, because the contributing employers are govern-
mental entities exempt from federal taxation. New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 576 (1946). See IRC § 115 (Supp. IV 1980).
84. Under the law of express trusts, a trustee will be charged for any interest or
penalty assessed for late payment of taxes of the trust. Matter of Smith, 123 Misc. 69,
71-72, 204 N.Y.S. 475, 477 (Sur. Ct. 1924); 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, at § 176. See
also Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wilby, 78 Ohio App. 183, 193, 69 N.E.2d 429, 435
(1946).
85. See supra note 75. "Qualify" does not mean "apply." While the Internal
Revenue Code appears to require a public employees' pension plan to satisfy all rele-
vant conditions contained in § 401(a) in order to receive favorable tax treatment for
itself and its participants and beneficiaries, there is no requirement that a pension
trust receive a favorable determination letter from the Internal Revenue Service in
order to claim favorable tax treatment. Rev. Proc. 80-30, § 2.15, 1980-81 C.B. 685. In
contrast, § 501(c)(3) exempt organizations are subject to § 508(a) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, which requires these exempt organizations to give notice of their applica-
tion for recognition of their exempt status.
As of 1976, 76.5% of all state and local governmental retirement systems either were
not familiar with the process of applying for determination letters of qualified status
or had simply not made an application. Only 13.9% of nonfederal governmental
plans had received favorable determination letters from the Internal Revenue Service
as of that date. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 213, app. I,
Table 13. In addition, in 1977 the Internal Revenue Service stopped trying to enforce
the provisions of § 401(a) with respect to governmental plans. IR-1869, Aug. 10,
1977. See infra notes 99-100.
86. Ordinary income includes any gain from the sale or exchange of property that
is neither a capital asset nor property used in a trade or business, as defined in IRC
1231(b), IRC § 64 (1976).
87. Capital gains include any gain from the sale or exchange of property that is a
capital asset, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. IRC § 1222 (Supp. IV 1980).
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federal income taxation under section 115 as income accruing to a
political subdivision of a state. 8 If so, violation of qualification re-
quirements under section 401(a) would not necessarily result in taxa-
tion of trust income.8 9 For example, NYCERS could claim that as a
separate and distinct "body corporate"90 established by New York
State enactment of title B of chapter 3 of the Administrative Code,9
it qualifies as a political subdivision of New York State for these pur-
poses. If it were not deemed to be a separate legal entity for these
purposes, it might seek federal income tax treatment under section
115 as an agency of The City of New York.92 Finally, in either ca-
pacity, NYCERS could argue for exemption from federal income
taxation under the constitutional rule of New York v. United States.9 3
Participants and beneficiaries of public pension funds exempt
under section 115 do not necessarily enjoy the second and third fed-
eral income tax benefits listed above. Those benefits are available
only to participants and beneficiaries of qualifying pension plans.
They are conferred upon the distributees of "any employees' trust
described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section
88. IRC § 115 (1976). There are no regulations under this provision that shed
light on whether a pension fund for governmental employees is considered an essen-
tial governmental function, or whether the income earned on investments of such
pension funds is deemed to accrue to a state or its political subdivision. The pertinent
case law and rulings deal with entities other than public employee pension plans and
therefore are not clearly dispositive. See, e.g., City of Bethel v. United States, 594
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979); Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. O'Malley, 232 F.2d 805 (8th
Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45.
The applicability of § 115 to public pension funds is indirectly supported by the
regulations under IRC § 892. Section 892 provides that the income of a foreign gov-
ernment from investments within the United States is excluded from gross income
and exempt from taxation. IRC § 892 (1976). The Internal Revenue Service inter-
prets this provision as excluding the income of pension plans of foreign governments.
Treas. Reg. § 1.892-1(b)(4), T.D. 7707, 1980-2 C.B. 213, 215.
89. See IRC § 501(a) (1976).
90. See 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 890, § 3, as amended by 1978 N.Y. Laws, chs. 448 &
785.
91. NEw YORK CITy ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, tit. B (1976).
92. NEW YORK CITy CHARTER § 1150(2) (Supp. 1981).
93. 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (states are immune from federal taxation when they act as
governments and possibly whenever the taxation would unduly interfere with their
functions as governments). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (extension under commerce clause of Fair Labor Standards Act minimum
wages and hours provisions to state employees impermissibly interferes with integral
state government functions). Sqe infra note 123.
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501(a)" 94 unless such exemption is denied under section 503 for en-
gaging in a prohibited transaction.95 Consequently, it appears that a
public pension fund must comply with the requirements of section
401(a) in order to entitle its participants and beneficiaries to
favorable tax treatment.96
Certainly, the Internal Revenue Service thinks IRC section 401(a)
controls exemption of trust income and capital gains for public97 as
94. IRC § 402(a)(1) (1976).
95. Id §§ 501(a), 503. Participants and beneficiaries receive favorable tax treat-
ment under § 402 only if the trust distributing their retirement benefits is both de-
scribed in § 401(a) and exempt from tax under § 501(a). Exemption under § 501(a)
may be denied under § 503. Section 503(a)(1)(B) provides that an organization de-
scribed in § 401(a) and referred to in § 4975(g)(2), ie., a "governmental plan," shall
not be exempt under § 501 (a) if it engages in a "prohibited transaction," as defined in
§ 503(b). A "governmental plan" is defined in § 414(d) as "a plan established and
maintained for its employees. . . by the government of any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing." As we have seen,
this analysis governs the participants' tax benefits regardless of whether the pension
plan's trust income is exempt because of§ 115 or § 401(a). See supra note 88 and text
accompanying notes 86-94.
96. Certainly, Congress assumed the tax benefits of participants and beneficiaries
of New York State and City pension plans were in jeopardy in 1975 and 1978. See
Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. 95-
497, 92 Stat. 1665; S. REP. No. 956, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.2 (1978). See also CON-
GRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. Under current versions of the
proposed Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability Act of 1982
(PEPPRA) that contain amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, § 401(a) would
be amended to be inapplicable to trusts of public pension plans covered by PEPPRA
and to provide that any such trust meeting the requirements of PEPPRA would be
considered a qualified trust described in § 401(a) and exempt from federal income
taxation under § 501(a). See H.R. 4928, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1312-13 (1981); S.
2105, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1312-13 (1981).
97 The Internal Revenue Service has stated, in the only pertinent Revenue Rul-
ing, that when a retirement system is established pursuant to a state statute, "the trust
fund and beneficiaries thereunder are not entitled to the Federal tax treatment appli-
cable with respect to a trust described in § 401(a) of the Code unless the trust meets
the requirements for qualification under that section." Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1972-1 C.B.
106.
On August 15, 1977, the Internal Revenue Service wrote Representative John Dent
in connection with the study of the pension task force of the House Committee on
Education and Labor. Representative Dent had asked whether public pension sys-
tems need to be qualified under § 401(a) in order for their participants to receive the
same tax treatment as participants in qualified private plans and for plan contribu-
tions and earnings to be exempt from federal taxation. The Service responded that
governmental plans must comply with pre-ERISA qualification standards to receive
favorable tax treatment, but pointed out its August 10, 1977 announcement of a mora-
torium on enforcing those standards pending reconsideration of the issues. Letter
from Fred J. Ochs, Director, Employee Plans Division, Internal Revenue Service, to
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well as private98 pension plans. At this time, the Internal Revenue
Service is not attempting to enforce the requirements of sections 501
and 401(a) as to public pension funds and their participants.99 If and
when some level of enforcement is undertaken, it seems likely that
good faith compliance with those provisions of the IRC that are most
directly related to the trustees' fiduciary duties, if not with all struc-
tural requirements for pension trusts, should serve to mitigate any
sanctions imposed upon the trustees and/or pension funds."t °
Accordingly, it behooves public pension fund fiduciaries to take
into account the exclusive-benefit-of-employees provisions of IRC
section 401(a) and the prohibited transaction provisions of section
503 when formulating their investment policies. As we shall see, sec-
tion 401(a)' 0 1 codifies the common law duty of loyalty and circum-
scribes the purposes for which investments of a pension trust fund
may be selected by requiring the fund's trustees to invest for the ex-
clusive benefit of the participants and beneficiaries. 10 2 IRC section
503(b) prohibits specific transactions between the pension trust and
its creator or any substantial contributor, among others, which do not
meet the arm's length standards established by its provisions.10 3
The interaction between compliance with sections 401(a) and
503(b) and pension fund trustees' fiduciary responsibilities led the
trustees of NYCERS and another New York City pension fund to
seek rulings"° from the Internal Revenue Service and passage of spe-
The Honorable John H. Dent (Aug. 15, 1977), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 673 app. X. See IR-1869, Aug. 10, 1977.
98. Private pension plans that satisfy the fiduciary requirements of ERISA § 404
are thereby deemed to qualify under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code and ac-
corded exemption under § 501(a) from federal income taxation with respect to their
ordinary income and capital gains. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302
(1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, stupra note 76, at 4569.
99. In 1977, the Internal Revenue Service issued an information release stating
that the Service was reconsidering whether or not state and local governmental pen-
sion plans are subject to tax on their income. It will not raise issues under existing
plans until the reconsideration is completed. IR-1869, Aug. 10, 1977.
100. Issues relating to such taxation are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer or
governmental unit pending completion of the reconsideration. IR-1869, Aug. 10,
1977. The Internal Revenue Service has issued no further pertinent releases or
rulings.
101. See supra note 75.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 218-31.
103. Cf. H.R. REp. No. 528, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 249 & 315.
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cial federal tax legislation in connection with their purchase of securi-
ties issued by New York City and the Municipal Assistance
Corporation for the City of New York (MAC) during the City's fiscal
crisis. Such special legislation was enacted in 1975 as Public Law 94-
236 and in 1978 as Public Law 95-497.5 Each statute provides that
if certain New York State and City pension funds, including
NYCERS, took certain actions, they nevertheless would not be
deemed to have failed to satisfy the requirements of section 401(a) or
to have engaged in prohibited transactions under section 503(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code. These actions include entering certain
securities purchase agreements and purchasing, under such agree-
ments, securities of the City and MAC. Under Public Law 94-236,
the New York State and City pension plans were permitted to con-
sider, for purposes of making or retaining such investments, the ex-
tent to which those investments of the pension plan would enable the
City to make future employer contributions and to act as guarantor
for benefits of the pension funds." Public Law 95-497 contained
numerous conditions to the pension funds' purchase of New York
City and MAC securities which, among other things, insured that the
percentage of the pension funds' assets invested in securities of MAC
and the City would decline even during the term of the securities
purchase agreements authorized under the statute.
10 7
105. Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub.
L. 95-497, 92 Stat. 1665. Pub. L. 94-236 and Pub. L. 95-497 are entitled identically:
"An Act Relating to the application of certain provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to specified transactions by certain public employee retirement systems
created by the State of New York or any of its political subdivisions."
106. Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-236, §§ l(a)(2) & (3), 90 Stat. 238. See 1975
N.Y. Laws, ch. 890, § 1, subd. b:
For the purchase of the obligations ... as described in this act, the trustees of
such retirement systems and funds in determining investments by such systems
and funds may consider, in addition to other appropriate factors recognized by
law, the extent to which such investments will (a) maintain the ability of the city
of New York (1) to make future contributions to such systems and funds and
(2) to satisfy its future obligations to pay pensions and retirement benefits to
members and beneficiaries of such systems and funds and (b) protect the sources
of funds to provide retirement benefits for members and beneficiaries of such
systems and funds.
107. Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. 95-497, § 2, 92 Stat. 1665. Bonds purchased
under both statutes are still outstanding. Interview with Jack R. Meyer, Deputy
Comptroller, Asset Management, The City of New York (Nov. 19, 1982). This raises
the question of whether Pub. L. 94-236 and particularly the more detailed require-
ments of Pub. L. 95-497 have any continuing application to such bonds. See Letter
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E. Proposed Federal Regulation: PEPPRA
Private pension law was revolutionized by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA).l08 Since
1975, several bills seeking enactment of statutes modeled on ERISA
covering public employee pension plans have been introduced in
Congress.10 9 The bills most recently under consideration in the
House were entitled the "Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting
and Accountability Act" (PEPPRA) to avoid confusion with ERISA.
These bills are designed to give participants in governmental pension
plans protection similar to that enjoyed by members of private pen-
sion plans under ERISA in the areas of reporting, disclosure to par-
ticipants and fiduciary standards applicable to plan fiduciaries.
Two versions of PEPPRA were introduced in each house of Con-
gress during the 1982 session." 0 All of these bills contain standards
from NYCERS to Secretary of the Treasury (Aug. 23, 1982) (on file with the Journal
of Urban and Contemporary Law).
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Governmental plans are
exempted by sections 2 and 402 of ERISA from the coverage of its titles I and IV, iLe.,
from all but those provisions that govern enforcement and some that amend the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. See supra note 76. ERISA-Iike requirements were extended to
pension plans for federal government employees by Act of Nov. 4, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-595, 92 Stat. 2541 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 68-68d (Supp. III 1979)). H.R. REP.
No. 528, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1982).
109. L. KOHLMEIER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND
ASSET MANAGEMENT 8 (1976). See, e.g., H.R. 6525, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Each of the proposed statutes was originally named the Public Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (PERISA).
While support for enactment of the Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting and
Accountability Act (PEPPRA) strongly continues among many unions representing
public employees, most municipal and state governments oppose PEPPRA as an un-
justified infringement of their power to govern. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION SYSTEMS-FEDERAL REGULATORY ISSUES 4-5
(1980).
Enactment of PEPPRA is uncertain. See 390 PENS. REP. (BNA) 113 (Jan. 25,
1982); 390 PENS. REP. (BNA) 611 (Apr. 26, 1982). In any event, PEPPRA would not
take effect for more than two and possibly five years following enactment by Con-
gress. See S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1308, 1315 (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 307, 312 (1981); H.R. 4928, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 307, 312 (1981); H.R.
4929, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 307, 312 (1981).
110. See S. 2105,97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
The House bills were amended to eliminate all differences except those pertaining to
tax treatment of governmental plans, which would remain unchanged under one ver-
sion. 91 Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) G-2 (May 11, 1982). Following that amendment,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/4
PUBLIC PENSION TRUSTEES
of fiduciary responsibility identical to those in ERISA,"' substan-
tially identical "prohibited transactions,""' and similar limitations
on acquisitions of securities, other obligations and real property of
any employer of participants of the pension plan." 3 Like ERISA,
each bill would include some generally available prohibited transac-
tion exemptions" 4 and establish a procedure' 15 whereby particular
transactions, otherwise prohibited, may be exempted by the pertinent
enforcement authority." 6 Because the PEPPRA fiduciary standard is
taken directly from ERISA and its related provisions are also based
upon ERISA, interpretations of ERISA in regulations, prohibited
transaction exemption letters, and other rulings may indicate PEP-
PRA's likely interpretation if and when enacted.
The provisions of PEPPRA defining a trustee's fiduciary duties
substantially declare the duties of prudence and loyalty under ex-
isting law." 7 Therefore, its enactment is unlikely to have much im-
mediate effect upon most public pension funds. One likely change,
however, is in the standard of skill and care applicable to trustees'
most section numbers in the House versions are identical to those in S. 2106. Herein-
after the House bills will be cited separately only where they differ from S. 2106.
111. S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1204 (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 204 (1981). Cf ERISA § 404.
112. S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1206 (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 206 (1981). Cf ERISA § 406.
113. S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1207 (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 207 (1981). Cf ERISA § 407.
114. S. 2105, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1208(b) (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 208(b) (1981). Cf ERISA § 408(b).
115. S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1208(a) (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 208(a) (1981). Cf ERISA § 408(a).
116. Under S. 2105, enforcement authority would be vested in the Board of Direc-
tors of a proposed Employee Benefit Administration. Id §§ 1301-03, 2001-05. The
Secretary of Labor, now the responsible official under ERISA, ERISA §§ 501-505,
would enforce PEPPRA under S. 2106 and both House bills, as amended, S. 2106,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-03 (1981).
117. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 2 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 76, at 2358. The general requirements relating to
fiduciary duties are expressed as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall carry out such fiduciary's functions with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(1) for the exclusive purpose of-
(A) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(B) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(2) with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
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investment decisions. Under PEPPRA, the standard probably would
be that of an expert in making investments for pension funds rather
than of an ordinary prudent person or prudent investor."18 PEPPRA
is also likely to affect in two additional respects the law in states
which, like New York, do not require diversification yet apply the
prudent person standard to each particular investment." 9  First,
PEPPRA generally mandates diversification of investments to elimi-
nate the risk of large losses. 120 This may preempt a state's permissive
view of diversification. Secondly, if, as is likely, PEPPRA is inter-
preted in the same way as ERISA, courts in these states may find it
difficult to insist that trustees scrutinize each investment individually
rather than judging the performance of a portfolio as a whole.' 2'
To the extent that state laws applicable to public pension funds
conflict with PEPPRA, there will be an issue under the tenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and other constitutional re-
straints upon congressional power, z2 as to whether or not PEPPRA
does and may regulate the terms of employment for state and munici-
pal employees. The sponsors of PEPPRA appear to have taken pains
to draft its provisions within the guidelines established by recent case
law.'2 Numerous groups of state and municipal officers argue, how-
ever, that application of at least some parts of PEPPRA, and perhaps
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(3) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(4) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
this Act.
S. 2106, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 204(a) (1981). See S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1204(a) (1981).
118. S. 2105, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1204(a)(2) (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(a)(2) (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 320-27.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 291-95.
120. S. 2105, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1204(a)(3) (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(a)(3) (1981).
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b) (1982); Nat'l Coordinating Committee for
Multiemployer Plans, Dep't of Labor Op. Letter No. 81-012A (Jan. 15, 1981).
122. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
123. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (decided after PEP-
PRA was introduced in the 97th Congress). But see EEOC v. Wyoming, No. 81-554,
slip op. at 9-12, 15 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1983).
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enactment of the entire statute, would be an unconstitutional inva-
sion of state power by Congress. 12
4
IV. STANDARDS OF LOYALTY AND PRUDENCE
Most of the state and local pension fund statutes incorporate the
common law standards of loyalty and prudence in a general way,
without providing much independent content to those standards
through statutory definition or interpretation by regulatory agencies.
The Internal Revenue Service and Department of Labor actively is-
sue regulations and interpretations of ERISA. Of course, the Internal
Revenue Service actively interprets the Internal Revenue Code. To
some extent, all these statutory standards build on the common law
standards.'25 This section examines each of the two basic duties as
they have been construed and supplemented by the various sources
of law.
A. Loyalty
A trustee's duty of loyalty to pension fund participants and their
beneficiaries is the duty to act for or solely in the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries. 126 The duty of loyalty is a component
of all fiduciary relations, but it is particularly intense in the case of a
trust created to provide economic support for specific beneficiaries.
127
Loyalty considerations may arise in several contexts. First, a con-
flict of interests may occur when a trustee's personal interests as well
as the interests of the fund's beneficiaries are at stake in a decision he
is making. 2 ' Secondly, the conflict with the beneficiaries' interests
may involve the interest of another entity or individual to whom the
trustee also owes a duty. This may be a corporation of which he is a
124. See Dissenting Views, H.R. REP. No. 528, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-65 (1982).
125. Cf. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
488 (1982).
126. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(a) ("solely in the interests of the members and benefi-
ciaries"); 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, § 170 at 1298. See ERISA § 404(a)(1) ("solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries"); IRC § 401(a) (1976) ("exclusive
benefit of [an employer's] employees or their beneficiaries").
127. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 170 at 1298. See also Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680
F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir.) ("The fiduciary obligations of the trustees to the partici-
pants and beneficiaries of the plan are those of trustees of an express trust-the high-
est known to the law."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959).
128. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943).
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director or officer, 129 a union representing participants and benefi-
ciaries of the pension fund of which he is an officer or employee, 3 or
the corporation or governmental entity which employs some or all
participants and beneficiaries of the pension fund as well as the
trustee.13 ' Finally, conflicts may arise between the interests of one
group of beneficiaries and those of another. In all such situations, a
trustee's duty of loyalty is to the trust, and among the beneficiaries he
must show impartiality or equal loyalty to all, i.e., current pensioners
and current employees who are future pensioners. 32
The first described situation involves the rule prohibiting trustee
self-dealing. The other situations either potentially or necessarily in-
volve the corollary rule that a trustee may not seek to benefit directly
or indirectly from trust transactions. As we shall see, some of these
potential conflicts are inherent in the composition of the boards of
trustees of many public pension funds. 133
The general rule of loyalty for fiduciaries is a flat prohibition of all
transactions involving personal conflicts of interests.' 34 The most
often quoted description of the standard of loyalty to which
fiduciaries are held is that of Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York
Court of Appeals: "A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."'135
One statutory expression of this basic rule is contained in the "pro-
hibited transactions" provisions of the New York City Administra-
tive Code 136 and the Insurance Regulations,13 7 which proscribe all
129. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 680 F.2d
263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982); In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97
N.E.2d 888 (1951); Berardi v. W.T. Lane, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 936, 333 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d
Dep't 1972).
130. See Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
131. See Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337 N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79
(1975).
132. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), afr'd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Dwight, 204 Misc. 204 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1952). Cf. Allied Chem. and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1971).
133. See infra notes 146-80 and accompanying text.
134. In re Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943).
135. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
136. NEw YORK CrrY ADMIN. CODE § B3-27.0 (1976). This provision states:
[T]he trustees and employees of [the board of trustees] are prohibited from hav-
ing any interest, directly or indirectly, in the gains or profits of any investment of
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self-dealing by the fiduciaries of New York public pension plans and
their agents. The prohibited transaction rule that is most likely to be
applicable to consideration of divergent investments by public pen-
sion fund trustees is the proscription against participating in a trans-
action with the pension plan on behalf of a party whose interests are
adverse to the plan.'38
The common law does not, however, prohibit all transactions when
fiduciaries represent two or more conflicting interests. When the
same person owes fiduciary obligations to two separate, coequal
trusts, he will not be presumed conclusively to have elevated the in-
terests of one over the other.' 39 Such a transaction, however, will be
closely scrutinized"4 and, if unfair to the beneficiaries of one of the
trusts, will be set aside by the court at the behest of those
beneficiaries.'
A trustee may also act in spite of a conffict of interests when the
trustee's participation in the transaction has been sanctioned by the
trust instrument142 or by statute.14 3 When fiduciary relationships in-
volve conflicts of interests authorized by trust instrument or statute, a
trustee is obligated to act with fairness to his beneficiaries and not
the retirement system .... The trustees and employees of [the board of trust-
ees], directly or indirectly, for themselves or as agents or partners of others, shall
not borrow any of its funds or deposits or in any manner use the same except to
make such current and necessary payments as are authorized by such board; nor
shall any [trustee] become an endorser or surety or become in any manner an
obligor for moneys loaned by or borrowed of such board.
137. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(h).
138. Id § 136.6(h)(2).
139. In re Van Deusen's Will, 34 Misc. 2d 173, 228 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sur. Ct. 1962);
In re Kramer's Estate, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sur. Ct. 1939); 2 A. ScoTr,
supra note 12, § 170.16. Contra Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979)
(under ERISA).
140. In re Van Deusen's Will, 34 Misc. 2d at 174-75, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
141. In re James' Estate, 86 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
142. In re Ridings, 297 N.Y. 417,79 N.E.2d 735 (1948); In re Hammer, 16 A.D.2d
I 1, 225 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1st Dep't 1962), af'dmem., 12 N.Y.2d 893, 188 N.E.2d 266,
237 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1963).
143. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afd, 680 F.2d
263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982) (ERISA); Westchester Chapter, Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 519, 521, 337 N.E.2d 748, 749, 375
N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (1975) (state statute designating state comptroller as sole trustee of
state employees' pension funds); Culinary Workers and Bartenders Union v. Gateway
Cafe, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979) (Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947).
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merely on an arm's-length basis.'" A court will scrutinize such
transactions carefully for evidence of the trustee's good faith."4 5
The duty of loyalty prescribed for all fiduciaries deserves even
more attention in the case of public pension funds than in other
fiduciary situations. In 1978 over three-quarters of all state and local
pension systems had employee representatives on their boards of
trustees. 146 Almost eighty percent had one or more government offi-
cials on their boards. 47 While some boards do have members ap-
pointed from outside of government, such as financial experts, those
trustees with dual roles, representing the governmental employer or
an employees' organization in addition to the pension fund, appear to
account for a substantial majority of all public pension fund
trustees. 148
The potential conflicts of interests are numerous. Brokerage busi-
ness and investment advisory contracts may be channeled to favored
regional firms with political influence or friends in the city or state
government. 149 Government officials may lend to their employers by
directing the investment of pension fund assets in state or local gov-
ernment securities.' 50 Even where outside financial experts are ap-
pointed as trustees, brokerage may be allocated to firms with which
they have commercial relationships.'
In Westchester Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association v. Lev-
itt, "I the plaintiff, a member of the Civil Service Employees' Associ-
ation, contested the propriety of the New York State Comptroller
acting simultaneously as the state officer responsible for issuing se-
curities on behalf of New York State and as the sole trustee of the
144. See In re James' Estate, 86 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
145. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 472-75; Heyman v. Heyman, 33
N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
146. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 206-07 app. I, Table
8.
147. Id
148. I.d
149. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 109, at 9.
150. In 1975-76, 2.8% of all assets held by state and local plans were invested in
state and local government securities. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 134 (Table F3).
151. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 109, at 10. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 232
(lists some inherent conflicts of interests faced by ex officio trustees of public pension
plans).
152. 37 N.Y.2d 519, 337 N.E.2d 748, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1975).
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funds of certain state employee retirement systems purchasing those
state securities. The New York Court of Appeals held that, because
the Comptroller's conflict of interests was created by statute, he was
not disqualified from acting on behalf of one or both parties to the
transaction. The potential conflict of interests created for the Comp-
troller, however, as trustee of the state retirement systems' funds, "an
especial obligation to act fairly on behalf of those concerned with the
results of the action taken."'1
53
NYCERS also has trustees with statutorily sanctioned conflicts of
interests. The New York City Administrative Code specifies the sys-
tem's trustees.154 Seven of the eleven trustees are statutorily desig-
nated New York City public officers,' 55 one is the representative to
the board of the Mayor of the City, and three are chief executive
officers of unions that represent participants for purposes of collective
bargaining on pension matters.
Each of the trustees, other than the representative appointed by the
Mayor,' 56 have some inherent conflicts of interests between his or her
responsibilities as a trustee of NYCERS and as an officer of the
City 17 or as an officer of the union. 5 Actual conflicts of interests
arise whenever the interests of the City or a union, as the case may
be, are not identical with those of the pension fund and its partici-
pants and beneficiaries qua recipients of retirement benefits. In-
stances of conflict for the City officials serving as trustees abound.
For example, there is tension between the City's desire to save money
153. Id at 521, 337 N.E.2d at 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 295. Cf Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.) (although ERISA permits officer of sponsoring
corporation to serve as plan fiduciary when plan acquires stock of corporation, in-
compatible conflicts may arise between fiduciary duties to corporation and to plan,
which require officer's resignation from trusteeship), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488
(1982).
154. NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b) (1976).
155. The New York City public officers who serve ex officio as trustees of
NYCERS are the President of the City Council, the Comptroller, and the presidents
of the five boroughs of the City. Id
156. The Mayor's representative may or may not face some conflict, depending on
his duties of loyalty. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
157. See Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d
519, 337 N.E.2d 748, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1975).
158. Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, officers of labor orga-
nizations occupy a position of trust with respect to members of their organizations. 29
U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976).
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by reducing its employer contributions' 59 and the amounts it pays for
administrative expenses of NYCERS160 on the one hand and, on the
other, the interest of NYCERS' participants and beneficiaries in in-
creased retirement benefits and increased expenditures for adminis-
tration of the system to improve its service of their needs. 6 ' Since
the potential conflicts of these City and union officer trustees are
sanctioned by statute, the conflicts will not, by themselves, disqualify
these officials from acting as trustees.1 62 But any actual conflict of
interests between a duty of a NYCERS trustee as an officer of the
City or as a fiduciary to union members and his fiduciary responsibil-
ity as a trustee will give rise to "an especial obligation to act fairly"'
163
on behalf of the system's participants and beneficiaries.
164
159. NEW YoRK CnY ADMIN. CODE §§ B3-17.0 (Supp. 1982), -18.0, -19.0 (1976).
160. The Expense Budget of the City annually includes appropriations for pay-
ment of administrative expenses of NYCERS. E.g., THE CITY OF NEw YORK Ex-
PENSE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 29E. The Administrative Code
appears not to provide for payment of administrative expenses out of the trust funds
of NYCERS. Administrative expenses clearly may be paid from the assets of
NYCERS if the City of New York is in bankruptcy proceedings and fails to provides
funds for payment of such administrative expenses as they fall due. 1975 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 890 § 3(b), as amended by 1978 N.Y. Laws, chs. 488 and 785. Apart from this
specific authorization, expenses necessarily incurred in acquiring, managing and pro-
tecting investments of NYCERS' funds may be paid from any income, interest or
dividends derived from deposits or investments of its funds. NEW YORK CITY AD-
MIN. CODE § E49-5.0(b).
161. The designated representatives of the NYCERS trustees are in the same po-
sition as their principals. They are authorized by statute to "act in the place" or as an
agent of the trustee designating him or her. Each designee must be an officer or em-
ployee under the control of the trustee. NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 82(1) (rev.
1976) (president of borough may appoint his deputy or executive assistant to dis-
charge his powers); NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 94(b) (Supp. 1981) (comptroller
may appoint deputy comptroller to act in his place as a member of pension board);
NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b)(2) (1976) (president of city council may
designate officer or employee appointed by her to act in her place as trustee of
NYCERS); NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b)(5)(c) (1976) (chief executive
officer of each union may designate person, if authorized under by-laws or constitu-
tion of union, to act in his place).
162. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 468; Withers v. Teachers' Retire-
ment Sys., 447 F. Supp. at 1256; Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v.
Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d at 521, 337 N.E.2d at 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
163. Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d at 521, 337
N.E.2d at 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
164. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981) (NLRA's exclusive-bene-
fit-of-employees rule requires LMRA authorized employer or employee nominated
trustees to give individual loyalty to beneficiaries).
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New York City agencies and officers, such as the Office of Eco-
nomic Development and the Comptroller, recently have developed
economic development investments "targeted" to the City and New
York State. If these efforts continue, some NYCERS trustees may
find themselves in the position of being architects and advocates of a
particular investment at the same time they are making a fiduciary
decision as trustees whether or not to make that investment. In such
situations, it would appear that the authorization by the pension sys-
tems chapters of the City's Administrative Code, 165 which are state
enacted, of the conflicts of interests of the ex officio trustees 166 would
override the proscriptions in the regulations issued by the New York
State Insurance Commissioner.167 The trustees would still have to
comply with the Westchester Chapter standard of fairness for statuto-
rily sanctioned conflicts of interests. 168
The statutes and plan instruments applicable to each public pen-
sion fund must be separately examined for each trustee to determine
whether particular conflicts of interests may be authorized. For ex-
ample, in NYCERS the representative of the Mayor appears to be in
a different position from the other trustees. The Mayor's "representa-
tive" is not appointed "to act in the place of' the Mayor and need not
be an officer or employee of the City, 169 although generally he is.
Thus, the Mayor's representative is the only trustee who does not
serve ex officio. It is doubtful whether the duty owed by the Mayor's
NYCERS representative to the public by virtue of any other public
office he may hold coincidentally carries with it the degree of fiduci-
ary obligation that he owes to the fund's participants and benefi-
ciaries in his capacity as a trustee. Therefore, there may arise
situations in which a Mayor's representative would be disqualified
165. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b) (1976).
166. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. at 1256-57. See also
supra text accompanying notes 156-61.
167. Cf NEW YORX CITY CHARTER § 2604(b) (rev. 1976).
No . . .salaried officer or employee of the city or any city agency:
(i) shall be or become interested directly or indirectly in any manner whatso-
ever except by operation oflaw in any business dealings with the city or any city
agency.
Id (emphasis added).
168. Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d at 521, 337
N.E.2d at 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
169. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b)(1) (1976).
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from acting both as a trustee and in his public office.' 70 Indeed, the
proscription in the Insurance Regulations, as well as the conflict of
interests provisions in the New York City Charter, 17 may bar that
trustee from acting as a member of the NYCERS board of trustees in
such situations.
Other types of potential conflicts may arise for other public officers
serving ex officio as trustees of public pension funds. For example,
the President of the Council of the City of New York is a statutorily
designated trustee of NYCERS. She is also a gubernatorily ap-
pointed member of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA), a New York State agency whose employees are participants
in NYCERS. The MTA failed to pay its fiscal year 1981 employer
contribution to NYCERS before the end of that fiscal year as re-
quired. When the NYCERS trustees considered commencing an ac-
tion against the MTA to enforce its obligation to make timely
contributions, the President of the Council sought advice on whether
to abstain from voting as a trustee to authorize commencement of
such an action.
The President of the Council was advised not to abstain. The po-
tential conflict of interests in this situation was not between the Presi-
dent of the Council's obligations as a trustee of NYCERS and her
obligations as President of the Council. If that had been the case, no
abstention would have been necessary under the holding of Westches-
ter Chapter concerning public officers who ex officio hold other pub-
lic offices that may be characterized as classic trusteeships.172
Instead, the Council President's potential conflict was between her
obligations as a NYCERS trustee and as a member of the MTA. The
President of the Council is a member of the MTA by virtue of guber-
natorial appointment for a term.173 It would seem that a legislative
170. If the Mayor's representative abstains from a vote of the NYCERS board
because of a conffict arising from his own public office, it seems probable that the
member of the Mayor's office designated to act in the absence of the Mayor's repre-
sentative, NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § B3-2.1(b)(1) (1976), would preside and
vote in his place. Even though the Mayor's representative need not be a member of
the Mayor's Office, the Administrative Code clearly provides that the designee to act
in his absence must be. Id Therefore, the designee would possess the same statutory
sanction to act in spite of conflicts of interests that is possessed by other public officer
members of the board. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
171. NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 2604(b)(1) (rev. 1976). See infra note 184.
172. Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 519,
521, 337 N.E.2d 748, 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (1975).
173. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAWS § 1263(I)(a) (McKinney 1982).
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determination that she should be an ex officio trustee of NYCERS is
entitled to greater weight than executive appointment to a public of-
fice unrelated to her elective office. Other considerations support this
conclusion. By statute the President of the Council is permitted, al-
though not required, to hold the MTA membership and her New
York City office simultaneously.174 She could resign her MTA mem-
bership, however, or even be removed under certain conditions.' 75
But she could not resign her NYCERS trusteeship unless she also
gave up her office as President of the Council, one of only three city-
wide elected offices. 17 6
Also relevant is the classic nature, in common law terms, of the
NYCERS trusteeship of identified funds for the benefit of a defined
class of beneficiaries. 77 While trust concepts are inherent in the pub-
lic office of a member of the MTA, 171 they are probably not trust
concepts in the same sense.179 Nor do they appear to relate to an
identifiable fund or funds or to a defined class of beneficiaries in the
same sense. It is likely that participants and beneficiaries of
NYCERS can sue the fund's trustees to surcharge them. 80 Whether
or not New York metropolitan area subway, bus and train riders
could seek to surcharge the members of the MTA for breach of their
responsibilities to the MTA ridership is less likely. Consequently, the
Council President's obligation as a trustee to act in the best interests
of NYCERS participants and beneficiaries should come before her
obligation to act as a member of the MTA.
Another conflict of interests situation that arises for public pension
funds involves the retention of independent legal counsel for any in-
174. Id § 1263(6).
175. Id § 1263(7).
176. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 23(a) (rev. 1976). The other city-wide officials
are the mayor, id § 4, and the comptroller, id § 91.
177. See I A. ScoTr, supra note 12, §§2.3, 3.1, 112, 122.
178. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20. See also Prescott v. Ferris, 251 A.D. 113, 119-
20, 295 N.Y.S. 818 (4th Dep't 1937).
179. See Seymour v. Ellison, 2 Cow. 13, 29 (N.Y. Err. 1823); In re Wood, Hopk.
Ch. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1823) ("The terms 'office' and 'public trust' have no legal or technical
meaning distinct from their ordinary signification. An office is a public charge or
employment .... The words 'public trust,' still more comprehensive, appear to in-
clude every agency in which the public, reposing special confidence in particular per-
sons, appoint them for the performance of some duty or service.").
180. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1250
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dmemn, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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vestment in securities issued or recommended by the public employer
or one of its affiliates.'' Again using New York City as an example,
its Corporation Counsel is by law the legal advisor to all City agen-
cies.' 2 Similar statutes are applicable in other states and municipali-
ties.' 8 3 There may be an issue of whether or not a public pension
fund is an agency for this purpose, especially if the independent
counsel is to be paid out of public pension fund assets rather than
public employer appropriations." 4 Assuming that it is a city agency
for this purpose, courts have implied, from the existence of conflict-
ing interests between a public agency and the overall governmental
entity, authority in the public agency to retain independent counsel,
even in the absence of specific statutory grants, and notwithstanding
the presence of statutes making a public law officer the lawyer for all
city agencies.' 85
A public officer lawyer may argue that the enactment setting forth
his duties resolves the conflict as it did in Westchester Chapter.'8 6 As
noted previously, in that case the court permitted the state Comptrol-
ler to sell state obligations to himself as trustee of two state public
pension plans, despite his obvious conflict of interests. That case,
however, is clearly distinguishable. The two functions that the
Comptroller exercised were specifically conferred on him, as Comp-
troller, by separate state enactments. Furthermore, each enactment
antedated the constitutional provision alleged to invalidate his dual
capacity in the transaction. Moreover, no case applying such an ar-
gument to a public officer lawyer has been found. Indeed, one bar
association opinion rejects its application to a city corporation
181. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 357-58.
182. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER §§ 394-95 (rev. 1976).
183. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1433 (1978); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1282 (1973).
184. The New York City Charter defines "city agency" as an "agency of govern-
ment, the expenses of which are paid in whole or in part from the city treasury." NEW
YORK CITY CHARTER § 1150a(2) (rev. 1976). See supra note 160.
185. Cahn v. Town of Huntington, 29 N.Y.2d 451,278 N.E.2d 908, 328 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1972); Fleischmann v. Graves, 235 N.Y. 84, 138 N.E. 745 (1923); Hanna v.
Rewkowski, 81 Misc. 2d 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Zablow v. Incorporated Village of
Freeport, 41 Misc. 2d 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
186. 37 N.Y.2d 519, 337 N.E.2d 748, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1975). See supra notes
152-53 and accompanying text.
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counsel. 187
The formal ethical considerations applicable to lawyers also come
into play. Committees of professional ethics of bar associations rec-
ognize that states or municipalities may have separate and distinct
interests from their constituent agencies. The Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association stated in a dif-
ferent context:
When a governmental body is organized into a number of sepa-
rate departments or agencies, such department or agency, and
not the parent governmental unit, should be treated as the client
for purposes of the rule which forbids the concurrent representa-
tion of one client against another. 188
Several bar association ethics committees have opined, citing Disci-
plinary Rule 5-105 of the Code of Professional Responsibility or its
antecedents, that where the relationship between two agencies has be-
come antagonistic, counsel fully independent of the government
should be retained for at least one of the agencies,189 perhaps even in
the absence of any statutory authorization for appointment of special
counsel.19° Indeed, the American Bar Association's Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility has opined that, notwithstand-
ing a municipal charter provision establishing the municipality's law
department as counsel for the municipality and all its departments
and officials, when a true conflict exists there is:
no way that, consistent with the Model Code [of Professional
Responsibility], these opposing positions can be properly advo-
cated in the same litigation by members of the same law depart-
ment, who work from the same office and who are responsible to
and presumably subject to the supervision and direction of the
same department head. 9
As expressed by the Attorney General of New York State, a munici-
187. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282
(1973).
188. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 447 (1976). See
also Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Op. 894 (1978). See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (United
States may sue United States agency).
189. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 501 (1979).
190. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282
(1973).
191. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1433
(1978).
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pal attorney in such a position of conflict is "ethically bound to de-
cline to participate" on behalf of the municipal officer or agency.192
In such situations, the duty of the law department to the "preeminent
authority" of the municipality itself will preclude the department
from representing the officer or agency rather than the municipal-
ity. 93 When the municipality's law department is privy to relevant
confidences of the agency or its employees as well as the municipality
due to its statutory status as counsel for both, or when appointment
of special counsel for the agency is not possible, the law department
may not represent either the municipality or the agency when their
interests come into conflict.'94 Furthermore, whether a public
agency, or an officer acting on its behalf, can consent to dual repre-
sentation in the event of a conflict is not clear. 95
. Once a public pension plan's right to representation by independ-
ent counsel is established, 196 its power to select that counsel should be
unfettered. The relationship of a public agency to its pension plan is
akin to that of a grantor to its trust. The law of trusts protects a
private trustee's right to employ counsel of his own choice, despite
any instruction in the trust instrument. 197 It "would interfere with
the proper administration of the trust if the trustee were compelled to
192. 1974 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 211, 212 (1974).
193. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 501 (1979).
194. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282
(1973).
195. Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 1433
(1978) (municipality and agency cannot consent to dual representation by municipal
attorney in adversary proceeding between them) and N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 143 (1970) (a municipal attorney may not represent private
clients in matters before administrative agencies of the municipality even if the mu-
nicipality purports to consent to such representation) with Ass'n of Bar of City of
N.Y. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 894 (1978) (city may consent to
representation by private lawyers actingpro bono on city's behalf and simultaneously
representing, in different matters, clients with interests adverse to city).
196. While the existence of a conflict creates for the public officer lawyer an af-
firmative ethical obligation to refuse to represent one of the parties to the conflict, it
would appear that the client, and ultimately the court, must make the final determina-
tion whether a conflict exists. Cf. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 17, 18 (MeKinney Supp.
1981) (authorizing indemnification of public officers and employees and appointment
of independent counsel when the appropriate public officer lawyer has a conflict of
interest and providing for court to resolve any dispute as to existence of conflict).
197. Matter of Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907) (dictum); In re Fol-
som's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sur. Ct. 1956), ajftd on other grounds, 6 A.D.2d 691,
174 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2d Dep't 1958), af'dsub nom. In re Folsom's Estate, 6 N.Y.2d 886,
160 N.E.2d 857, 190 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1959); latter of Lawless' Will, 194 Misc. 844, 861,
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rely upon the advice of an attorney not selected by him, since the
relationship is highly fiduciary in character."'
198
As noted above, courts require fairness to both parties in transac-
tions by fiduciaries involving authorized conflicts. They understand
that investments or other transactions negotiated at arm's length usu-
ally result in benefits to both parties. Fairness to one party will gen-
erally be matched by fairness to the other.199 Strict application of the
sole benefit rule, barring benefits to trustees or other interested par-
ties under any circumstances, would effectively prohibit all such
transactions, even when such transactions were authorized and
clearly in the interest of the beneficiaries of the trust. Accordingly, so
long as transactions involving authorized conflicts of interests are fair
to the beneficiaries, and only incidental benefits accrue to other inter-
87 N.Y.S.2d 386,405 (Sur. Ct. 1949), affldmem., 277 A.D. 1045, 100 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d
Dep't 1950).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 126 (1959).
From the power to select independent counsel flows the power to compensate such
counsel. A grantor may not limit the power of a private trustee to incur all expenses
necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purpose of a trust, including reasonable
attorneys' fees. In re Folsom's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Matter of
Olney, 255 A.D. 195, 7 N.Y.S.2d 89 (4th Dep't 1938), appeal dismissed, 281 N.Y. 98,
22 N.E. 252 (1939); In re Estate of Thaw, 60 Misc. 2d 184,302 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (Sur.
Ct. 1969). Cf Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) (state cannot require Legal Serv-
ices Society to forego attorney's fees in civil rights suits brought against state or its
employees by Society), cert. denied sub nom., O'Bannon v. Shadis, 103 S. Ct. 300
(1982) See also 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12, § 188. In the case of a private trust, such
expenses will be discharged from the assets of the trust. 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12,
§ 188. If the trust has two or more trustees, as do most public pension funds, each co-
trustee can employ his own counsel, see Matter of Bloomingdale's Estate, 172 Misc.
218, 14 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sur. Ct. 1939), and seek reimbursement from the trust for his
counsel's fees, see 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12, § 244. Even when the trustee did not
properly incur the expenses for his own counsel, he is entitled to reimbursement to the
extent that the trust and its beneficiaries benefit from the representation. Id § 245.
Payment of a public pension fund's independent counsel fees raises additional issues
such as whether an appropriation for the payment is necessary, a question answered
in the negative by at least one court. Fleischmann v. Graves, 235 N.Y. 84, 138 N.E.
745 (1923); Barry v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 712, 22 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct.),
afl'd, 261 A.D. 957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Ist Dep't 1941). Given the inherent conflict
concerning the amount to be spent on administrative expenses between any public
pension fund and the state or municipal employer, in the absence of an explicit statute
to the contrary, these principles of trust law should apply to afford protection to the
participants and beneficiaries of the fund.
199. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88 (a trust fund's purchase of securities, at
a price that results in a profit for the seller but does not exceed the fair market value
of the securities at the time of purchase, is consistent with-the exclusive-benefit-of-
employees rule of the Internal Revenue Code).
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ested parties, courts do not find trustees guilty of breaches of trust for
violating the sole benefit rule.
The New York case of Heyman v. Heyman2" provides an example
from the common law for private trusts. Heyman involved the inter-
pretation of a trust instrument in which the grantor appointed him-
self as trustee, designated his children as beneficiaries and authorized
the purchase or sale of securities by the trust to or through any
brokerage firm of which the grantor-trustee was a member. The
court acknowledged that the grantor properly authorized securities
transactions for the trust by firms "with which he might be personally
identified as to whose integrity and skill he would have personal
knowledge and in which he reposed the fullest confidence." 20 1 The
court further stated that "[e]ven in the absence of an express provi-
sion requiring a trustee to act in good faith," and regardless of the
exact terms in the trust instrument, the law of New York State re-
quires that the trustee implement such transactions in good faith.
The court held that the authorization of interested transactions must
be construed favorably to the beneficiaries and bar the trustee from
purchasing securities from the trust estate at prices below their mar-
ket values.20 2 The trustee and his brokerage firm, however, were per-
mitted to earn the same profit on the authorized transactions as any
banking or brokerage firm might make in dealing with a prudent
trustee in the normal course of business. 20 3
On the other hand, Blankenshiv v. Boyle2 4 demonstrates that when
the primary purpose of a transaction is to benefit someone other than
pension fund participants, trustees act in violation of their fiduciary
responsibility even though incidental benefits inure to the trust fund.
This case involved a union member's action against the union officer,
the employer representative, and the "neutral" plan administrator
who were serving as trustees of the United Mine Workers pension
fund. The action sought their removal as trustees for violations of
their fiduciary duties. In deciding the case, the court drew upon
200. 33 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
201. Id at 241.
202. Id at 239, 243.
203. Id at 241. See Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Levitt,
37 N.Y.2d 519, 337 N.E.2d 748, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1975); Matter of Will of Heiden-
reich, 85 Misc. 2d 135, 378 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
204. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.), stay deniedper curiam, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1971), affidmer., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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precedents from the common law of trusts to give content to the La-
bor Management Relations Act.2°5 It held that the trustees had
breached their fiduciary duty to the participants and beneficiaries by
purchasing common stock of certain electric utilities. According to
this court, the primary purpose of these investments was to give the
union leverage in persuading the utilities to convert to union-mined
coal. The trustees argued that such a purpose was proper, because
employer contributions to the fund were based upon the production
of union-mined coal. The court did not dispute any benefits that ac-
crued to the trust from the investments, yet found that the invest-
ments were made primarily for the collateral benefits they gave to the
union and the coal operators represented by the employer-trustee.20 6
It characterized these investments as "a clear case of self-dealing on
the part of [the union official and coal operator] trustees and. . . a
breach of trust. 20 7
The divided loyalties of pension fund trustees were also at issue in
Donovan v. Bierwirth.208 In Bierwirth, the United States Secretary of
Labor challenged purchases of Grumman Corporation stock, at al-
legedly inflated prices, by the trustees of the Grumman employees'
pension plan. The purchases were made while the corporation was
defending a hostile takeover attempt. The trustees, who were all of-
ficers or employees of the corporation, asserted that they purchased
the stock on behalf of the pension plan because they believed that the
stock was a good investment for the pension plan and that a success-
ful takeover would be harmful to the pension plan. The Grumman
pension plan and its trustees were subject to ERISA.209 For aid in
interpreting its codification of the duty of loyalty, the courts looked to
205. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)
(1976).
206. 329 F. Supp. at 1095. In arriving at this conclusion, the court examined the
conduct of the trustees in administering the fund, including the absence of regular
meetings; the way important matters were resolved by the union trustee, who was
chairman of the board, with neither formal meetings nor even informal consultations
with the trustee representing the employers; the extreme deference of the plan admin-
istrator to the union trustee; and the granting of proxies for the utility stocks held by
the fund to union officials involved in the campaign to force utilities to buy union-
mined coal.
207. Id at 1106.
208. 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
209. Id at 467.
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common law principles.21 The federal district court examined the
trustees' decisionmaking process and concluded that the trustees had
"manifested an inability to separate their corporate loyalty and their
loyalty to the Pension Plan." '' The court of appeals found it unnec-
essary to decide whether the trustees' primary purpose had been to
benefit the corporation rather than the pension plan, because of the
trustees' lack of due diligence in investigating their options. 2 ' Nev-
ertheless, the court accepted the trustees' argument that a prudent
and loyal decision by trustees with dual loyalties does not violate
their duties to a pension plan simply because it incidentally benefits
the corporation as well as the participants and beneficiaries.21 3
Tests of "good faith" and "primary purpose," as enunciated in
these cases, necessarily involve subjective assessments of a trustee's
motives and intentions. As shown in Blankenshiq and Bierwirth,
however, a court reviewing a situation involving a trustee's potential
conflict of interests will scrutinize all the evidence to insure that the
substance of the transaction is fair to the trust's beneficiaries and that
the trustee has discharged his duties in a manner that is primarily
intended to benefit the trust.
Some special issues may arise for trustees of pension funds from
their duty of equal loyalty to all participants-the duty not to favor
the interests of one group of beneficiaries of a trust over those of an-
other group. 1 4 A potential conflict between participants drawing re-
tirement benefits from NYCERS and participants employed by The
City of New York arose in the context of the NYCERS trustees' deci-
sion in 1975 to invest in New York City and Municipal Assistance
Corporation securities in the hope of preventing municipal bank-
210. See id at 469-71; 680 F.2d at 271. One federal district court judge has stated
that the loyalty and prudence provisions of ERISA "establish uniform federal re-
quirements to be interpreted both in the light of the common law of trusts, as well as
with a view toward the special nature, purpose, and importance of modem employee
benefit plans." Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D.
Hawaii 1980) (citations omitted).
211. 538 F. Supp. at 476. See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 459 (10th Cir.
1978) (ERISA employee stock ownership plan subject to "solely in the interest" and
"prudence" tests of § 404(a)(1) even though designed to hold employer securities).
212. See infra text accompanying notes 336-58.
213. 680 F.2d at 271.
214. See In re Stillman, 81 Misc. 2d 747, 366 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sur. Ct. 1975); In re
Mendleson's Will, 46 Misc. 2d 960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sur. Ct. 1965); 2 A. SCOTT,
supra note 12, § 183; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 comment a (1959).
See infra text accompanying notes 277-82.
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ruptcy.215 It was estimated at that time that if New York City ceased
making employer contributions to NYCERS, the then-current assets
of NYCERS would enable payment of retirement benefits to then-
current retirees for approximately seven or eight years.216 Under
such circumstances, the participants employed by the City had a
greater interest in preventing the City's bankruptcy than did retirees,
many of whom were likely to receive all of their retirement benefits
within eight years. 217
Because of the substantial tax benefits potentially available to par-
ticipants in qualified pension trusts, the body of law relating to the
duty of loyalty which is perhaps most important from their perspec-
tive pertains to IRC section 401 (a).21 8 The duty of loyalty is declared
three different ways in section 401(a). First, a qualified trust is re-
quired to be "created or organized . . for the exclusive benefit of
[the] employees or their beneficiaries., 219 Next, subsection (1) re-
quires that any contributions made to the trust by the employer, the
employees or an affiliated employer must be "for the purpose of dis-
tributing to such employees or their beneficiaries the corpus and in-
come of the fund accumulated by the trust.22 0 Finally, subsection (2)
requires the trust instrument to make it impossible "for any part of
the corpus or income to be . . .used for, or diverted to, purposes
other than for the exclusive benefit of [the] employees or their benefi-
215. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), affd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Allied Chem. & Alkali
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172-74 (1971).
216. Telephone interview with Jonathan Schwartz, Actuary for the New York
City Employees' Retirement System (Dec. 21, 1982).
217. Compare the following statement by the National Retired Teachers' Associa-
tion and the American Association of Retired Persons following purchase of the City
and MAC securities:
Retirees' preference would be to maximize the amount of assets that are invested
in the most secure, most liquid, and highest yielding manner possible. On the
other hand, a relatively young City employee might be willing to sacrifice the
security of the retirement system if the sacrifice might save his or her job and
enable the City to contribute to the retirement systems so that plans will be sol-
vent upon his or her retirement. . . . mhe interests of retirees very often con-
flict with those of active workers. The active worker is far more concerned with
the well-being of his or her present employer than is the retiree.
Hearing on Ownership and Control of Pension Fund Assets before the President's
Comm'n on Pension Policy 9-10 (Dec. 10, 1979).
218. See supra note 75.
219. IRC §401(a) (1976).
220. Id § 401(a)(1).
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ciaries" 221 prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities related to the em-
ployees and their beneficiaries, including future contingent benefits
as well as present vested benefits.222
Not only must the written instrument or plan comply with these
requirements, but the plan must achieve in operation the effects man-
dated by the statute.223 If the plan is designed or implemented in a
way that amounts to a subterfuge to avoid the requirements of the
statute, it will not satisfy the requirements of section 401(a).224 "All
of the surrounding and attendant circumstances and the details of the
plan will be indicative of whether it is a bona fide. . . pension...
plan for the exclusive benefit of employees in general. 225
As construed by the Internal Revenue Service, these criteria estab-
lish for trustees a standard of the highest loyalty to the participants
and beneficiaries as present or future recipients of pension benefits.
Treasury Regulation section 1.401-2226 interprets purposes of a plan
"for the exclusive benefit" of the participants and beneficiaries as ex-
cluding "all objects or aims not solely designed" to satisfy contingent
and vested "liabilities" to participants and their beneficiaries.227
This regulation should be read in conjunction with Revenue Rul-
ing 69-494,28 which outlines the general standards under section
401(a), with which a tax-exempt employees' trust must comply in or-
der to purchase the securities of an employer. It requires the invest-
ment of trust funds, as well as other activities of the trust, to be for
the "primary purpose" of benefiting participants and beneficiaries.
Further, the ruling explains that this test does not preclude transac-
tions from which others also derive some benefit. The Revenue Rul-
ing gives as an example a sale of securities at a fair market value that
yields a profit for the trust. The Revenue Ruling established four
221. Id § 401(a)(2).
222. Id; Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b)(2), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 227.
223. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 225.
224. Id § 1.401-1(b)(2), 1956-2 C.B. at 224; § 1.401-1(b)(3), 1956-2 C.B. at 225.
225. Id § 1.401-1(b)(3), 1956-2 C.B. at 225.
226. Regulation 1.401-2 remains applicable to post-ERISA private plans as well
as governmental plans. Regulation 1.401(a)-2(a) provides that rules contained in reg-
ulation 1.401-2 remain applicable to all plans seeking to qualify for tax-exempt status
under section 401(a) "except as otherwise provided." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-2(a)
(1980).
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(3), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 226.
228. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88.
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requirements with which such purchases of employer securities must
comply:
(1) the cost must not exceed fair market value at time of
urchase; (2) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate
must be provided; (3) sufficient liquidity must be maintained to
permit distributions in accordance with the terms of the plan;
and (4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor
would adhere to must be present.229
These requirements essentially establish an arm's length standard for
such securities transactions.
In Shelby U.S. Distributors v. Commissioner,230 the United States
Tax Court applied these standards and those of section 401(a) to a
series of transactions between a qualified trust and the two employers
of the trust beneficiaries. As a result of these transactions, approxi-
mately ninety-six percent of the trust's assets consisted of notes or
nonvoting preferred stock of the employer corporations. Through
these investments the trustees, who were also employees and major
shareholders of the employer corporations, enabled the corporations
to acquire their businesses and provided additional capital for busi-
ness operations. The notes were secured, interest payments were
made under the notes, and principal payments were made when re-
quested, according to the terms of the notes. Neither the adequacy of
the security nor the reasonableness of the interest was questioned by
the Internal Revenue Service. The court concluded that the Service
had no basis for revoking the trust's exemption.23'
Revenue Ruling 69-494 and Shelby evidence the recognition by the
Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court of the same realities rec-
ognized by the common law. As a practical matter, the test applied to
a fiduciary's duty of loyalty must look more to the primary purpose
rather than to the exclusive benefit of a transaction.232
229. Id
230. 71 T.C. 874 (1979).
231. Id at 885. The court observed:
[l]t is recognized that the investments of a trust may result in some benefit to
another without the trust losing its exemption, so long as there is no misuse of the
trust funds. . . . Though the employers, their officers, and the trustees may all
have derived some indirect benefit from the use of the trust funds, it appears that
the trust was also allowed to earn a reasonable return on its investments and that
there was no channeling of trust profits into the hands of individuals.
232. Id Cf. Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 1979) (in absence of
statutorily sanctioned conflict, ERISA entitles participants of private pension funds to
have trustees negotiate best possible, and not merely fair, terms for transactions).
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The prohibited transaction proscriptions applicable to governmen-
tal plans under the Internal Revenue Code take a consistent ap-
proach.233 Section 503(b) proscribes certain transactions, between the
governmental plan and certain affiliated persons, that are unfair to
the governmental plan. These affiliated persons include the "creator
of [the] organization" and any "person who has made a substantial
contribution to [the] organization." A governmental employer is
likely to fall under one or both of these categories. The proscribed
transactions include any loan by an exempt organization for less than
adequate security or for less than a reasonable rate of interest, 234 any
purchase of a substantial amount of securities or other property for
less than adequate consideration,235 any sale of a substantial part of
the organization's securities or other property for less than adequate
consideration, 3 6 or any other transaction that results in a substantial
diversion of the organization's income or corpus.237 The IRC im-
poses an extreme penalty upon governmental pension plans that en-
gage in a prohibited transaction under section 503(b)-the
organization loses its section 501(a) exemption.2 38 Such loss of enti-
tlement to section 501(a) exemption status could jeopardize tax bene-
fits that directly and indirectly accrue to its participants and
beneficiaries.2 39
233. IRC § 503(a)(1)(B) (1976). At one time § 503 of the Internal Revenue Code
applied to all private as well as public pension plans. When ERISA was enacted,
§ 503 was narrowed to cover only governmental plans, church plans, certain wholly
contributory pension plans and certain supplemental unemployment compensation
pension plans. Private pension plans are now governed by the prohibited transaction
provisions of §§ 406(a) and 406(b) of ERISA and IRC § 4975(c), also enacted as part
of ERISA. These provisions prohibit all transactions between the trusts and certain
interested parties, regardless of the fairness of their terms, unless the Department of
Labor issues a special prohibited transaction exemption. Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590
F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979).
234. IRC § 503(b)(1) (1976).
235. Id § 503(b)(4).
236. Id § 503(b)(5).
237. Id § 503(b)(6).
238. Id § 503(a). Under ERISA, if a fiduciary of a private pension plan engages
in a prohibited transaction, he or she will become an insurer of the losses sustained by
the plan, ERISA § 409(a), and will be subject to imposition of an excise tax equal to
5% of the amount involved in the transaction or 100% of that amount if the transac-
tion is not corrected within the taxable period (unless the fiduciary was acting only in
his or her fiduciary capacity). IRC § 4975(a), (b) (1976).
239. All versions of PEPPRA and PERISA thus far have included prohibited
transaction provisions modeled upon either § 503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,
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Thus, the Internal Revenue Code appears to require that the exclu-
sive purpose of trust investments be the payment of retirement bene-
fits to participants, although incidental benefits, not detrimental to
that purpose, accrue to the participants and beneficiaries or to other
groups. The cases examined above, the language of statutes codify-
ing the duty of loyalty,2' and the Internal Revenue Service's inter-
pretation of IRC section 401(a)24 all evidence tension. This tension
exists between the benefits to be derived from an investment and the
purposes for which the investment is made, between the desire to pro-
vide maximum protection for participants and beneficiaries and the
multiple benefits and purposes that can be and often are interwoven
in a single investment decision. Much of this tension is expressed in
the shifting use of the terms "exclusive," "sole" and "primary." Mul-
tiple benefits from a trust's investments cannot successfully and
should not be proscribed. The attempt to label some benefits as pri-
mary and others as incidental involves subjective characterization.
Loyalty is a state of mind. The real concern underlying the duty of
loyalty is the fiduciary's purpose for making a particular investment
decision. If the purpose is to benefit the pension fund's participants
and beneficiaries, the trustees do not breach their duty of loyalty.
Consequently, ERISA and PEPPRA appear to express the underly-
ing principle most accurately when they provide that a pension fund
trustee must invest trust assets "for the exclusivepurpose . . . of pro-
viding benefits to participants and beneficiaries."242
B. Prudence.- Permissible Considerations
Prudence is the other duty inherent in the notion of trusteeship.
Trustees of public pension funds are subject to the duty of prudence
under the common law and possibly under state codifications such as
with its arm's length standard, or the per se approach of § 406(b) of ERISA. The
versions that would amend the Internal Revenue Code would exempt from the opera-
tion of § 503 all governmental plans to which PEPPRA applies. See S. 2105, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1313 (1981). Legislation was introduced in the second session of the
97th Congress under which the standards applicable to private pension funds would
revert to the arm's length standard contained in § 503(b) of the IRC. See H.R. 4330,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3503(a) (1981). See also H.R. REP. No. 528, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 44 (1982).
240. See supra notes 67, 75, 117, & 136.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 218-32.
242. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A); S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1204(a)(1)(A) (1981);
S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(a)(1)(A) (1981) (emphasis added).
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
88 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:43
the New York Insurance Regulations.243 In addition, the Internal
Revenue Service appears to be in the process of incorporating a pru-
dence standard into the requirements of IRC section 401(a).244 These
common law and statutory standards establish outer boundaries for
investment decisions of public pension fund trustees. This section ex-
amines the primary elements of the prudence standard: risk consider-
ations, yield, and diversification requirements.
1. Risk Considerations
Safety of the trust corpus is the single most important factor for the
trustees to consider, although that does not mean they may take no
risks whatsoever.245 As expressed in Harvard v. Amory, "[d]o what
you will, the capital is at hazard." '246 Safety of the investment will
receive the greatest weight, however, when balanced against other
permissible investment considerations.
The most widely cited case involving an investment of trust fund
assets that allegedly failed to meet the established standard of safety
arose in connection with the 1975 fiscal crisis of The City of New
York. To help the City avoid bankruptcy, NYCERS, the Teachers'
Retirement System of the City of New York, and several other New
York State and City pension systems purchased hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of securities issued by the City of New York and the
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), and entered commitments
to invest a substantial percentage of their assets in such securities.
These purchases were challenged in Withers v. Teachers' Retirement
System247 as a breach of the trustees' fiduciary duty. Because the
decision in this case explicitly rested on special factors other than risk
of the investments, it is discussed at length in a later section of this
article.248
The purchases of New York City and MAC securities litigated in
Withers also were the subject of Internal Revenue Service scrutiny.
While section 401(a) primarily articulates the duty of loyalty owed
participants and beneficiaries by a pension trust's trustees, diversion
243. 11 NYCRR § 136.6(a), supra note 64.
244. See Detroit Letter Ruling, 371 PENS. REP. (BNA) J-9 to J-10 (Dec. 7, 1981).
See also infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
245. 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, § 227.3 at 1812.
246. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
247. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dmem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 303-08.
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of financial benefits from the trust to third parties necessarily affects
the fund's safety and yield. These factors in turn affect the benefits
accruing to the participants and beneficiaries. Consequently, the
trustees of NYCERS and the Teachers' Retirement System asked the
Internal Revenue Service to rule that purchases of MAC and City
securities by the two retirement systems constituted neither prohib-
ited transactions under section 503(b)(1) nor violations of the exclu-
sive-benefit-of-employees rule contained in section 401(a).
The Internal Revenue Service issued two letters of intent to rule on
December 5, 1975 and December 15, 1975.249 Neither letter demon-
strated the Service's acceptance of any relaxation of the trustees' duty
to invest the retirement systems' assets in accordance with traditional
standards of safety. In fact, the Service explicitly assumed that all
four requirements for investments in employer securities, set forth in
Revenue Ruling 69-494,250 would be met before it confirmed its in-
tent to rule that the purchases would not violate the exclusive-benefit-
of-employees rule of section 401(a). As described above,251 these re-
quirements include the receipt of a fair return by the trust on its
purchase of securities and the presence of safeguards that a prudent
investor would require.252 Thus, the letters of intent to rule afforded
little assurance to the retirement systems that was not already avail-
able to them.253
The assumption by the Internal Revenue Service that the
purchases of City securities by NYCERS and the Teachers' Retire-
ment System would be accompanied by the safeguards of a prudent
investment strongly suggests that the Service interprets the exclusive-
benefit-of-employees rule to preclude a less than "prudent" level of
safety for investments of qualified public pension plans. Thus, their
purchases of City and MAC securities might have jeopardized the tax
249, On file with the Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law.
250. 1969-2 C.B. 88.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
252. 1969-2 C.B. 88.
253. Rulings were never issued to NYCERS and the Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem. The 1975-1978 purchases of City securities probably were prohibited transac-
tions. See GCM 38972, IRS POSITIONS (CCH) 1174 (June 30, 1982). Instead, from
March 19. 1976, Pub. L. 94-236 provided exemptions from § 401(a) and § 503(b) for
purchases, between August 20. 1975 and December 31, 1978, of MAC or New York
City securities by the two retirement systems and certain other City pension funds. In
1978. Pub. L. 95-497 was enacted to provide for similar exemptions for purchases of
MAC or City securities between July 1, 1978 and June 30, 1982. See supra text ac-
companying notes 105-07.
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exempt status of NYCERS and the Teachers Retirement System
without the enactment of special legislation for the express purpose of
preserving this status.254
Nevertheless, at least one commentator 255 has pointed to a pub-
lished private letter ruling, issued on October 31, 1981 to the City of
Detroit, Michigan,256 as evidence that the standard of safety implicit
in the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule of section 401(a) may have
been relaxed by the Service.257 Analysis does not support this sug-
gestion. The City of Detroit requested this ruling on behalf of two
employee pension funds under circumstances similar to, but not as
extreme as, those presented by the New York letters discussed above.
The City is the major contributor to the funds and the ultimate obli-
gor of financial benefits due their participants. It incurred substantial
budget deficits in fiscal year 1980 and was delinquent in making its
employer contributions to the funds. Only after the two funds insti-
tuted legal action, Detroit entered into and then defaulted on a con-
sent agreement and the funds reinstituted their litigation, did Detroit
make late payments for that fiscal year. In order to make its contri-
butions to the pension funds for fiscal year 1981, Detroit proposed to
issue general obligation bonds, use the proceeds from the sale of half
the issue to a syndicate of banks to pay half of its delinquent contri-
butions, and tender cash plus 25 percent of the issue of bonds to the
funds in satisfaction of its remaining obligation to make
contributions.
Two factors distinguish this request from the New York situation.
First, one of the major rating agencies rated the Detroit bond issue as
investment grade. Second, Detroit did not request a ruling that the
proposed transactions satisfied the requirements of section 401(a). It
asked the Service to rule that, in determining whether to accept the
bonds for half of the delinquent contributions, the economic circum-
stances of Detroit, as principal contributor to the pension funds and
254. Pub. L. 94-236 and Pub. L. 95-497 each state that any pension plan covered
by the legislation "shall not be considered to fail to satisfy the requirements of
§ 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and shall not be considered to have
engaged in a prohibited transaction described in § 503(b) of such Code" if its actions
fall within the safe-harbor provisions of the legislation. Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L.
94-236 § l(a), 90 Stat. 238; Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. 95-497 § l(a), 92 Stat. 1665.
255. M. LEIBIG, SOCIAL INVESTMENT AND THE REGULATION OF PENSION INVEST-
MENTS: AN OUTLINE OF BASIC MATERIALS 37 (1982) (prepared for AFL-CIO Law-
yers' Meeting, Minneapolis, Minn., May 5-8, 1982).
256. 371 PENS. REP. (BNA) J-9 (Dec. 7, 1981).
257. M. LEIBIG, supra note 255, at 37.
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the ultimate obligor of their benefits, could be taken into account by
the funds "in establishing the terms for the portion of the delinquent
contributions to be satisfied by the bonds accepted by the [funds]. 258
In ruling affirmatively, the Internal Revenue Service expressly ad-
hered to the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule and indeed explicitly
incorporated the prudent person rule into section 401(a). The letter
ruling stated:
In determining whether a course of action is for the exclusive
benefit of the employees within the meaning of section 401(a) of
the Code, the trustees of the two plans must discharge their du-
ties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under all the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con-
duct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims.2 59
This language is taken verbatim from the fiduciary provisions of ER-
ISA.26 ° The prudent person rule does not appear in either section
401(a) or its regulations. Yet, section 401(a), not ERISA, was the
subject of this ruling. The Service did not address the fundamental
question of the safety of Detroit's bonds and, consequently, may have
ruled only that if the bonds are prudent investments, the factors men-
tioned in the request for a ruling also may be taken into account.261
Since the Detroit ruling was a private letter ruling, its apparent
incorporation of the prudent person standard into section 401(a) is
supposed to be without precedential value.262 It is contrary to the
holding in Shelby that requirements of liquidity and diversification
and the rule of prudence have not acquired the force of law under
section 401(a).26 3 The Detroit ruling may indicate, however, that the
ERISA standards applied to private plans by the Department of La-
bor are influencing the Internal Revenue Service's approach in en-
forcing section 401(a) requirements for public employee plans.
258. 371 PENS. REP. (BNA) J-9 (Dec. 7, 1981) (emphasis added).
259. Id J-10 to J-11.
260. See ERISA § 404(a)(1). See also S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1204(a)
(1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 204(a) (1981).
26 1. See .upra note 15 and accompanying text. See also GCM 38972, IRS Posi-
lIONS (CCH) 1174 (June 30, 1982).
262. IRC § 61100)(3) (1976).
263. 71 T.C. 874, 880-82 (1979). The tax years in question in this case were 1971,
1972 and 1973, all prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 230-31.
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2. Yield
Return on investment is the second mandatory aspect of the pru-
dent person rule. Most New York cases require the fiduciary to pro-
cure a reasonable and regular amount of income or that level of
income that will not require the fiduciary to incur undue risks with
the capital of the trust.2 64 Some cases have held or implied that trust-
ees are duty-bound to make the maximum productive investment for
their beneficiaries within the allowable range of risk,265 but these
cases generally involve conflicts of interests on the part of the trust-
ees,266 or investment decisions based on other impermissible fac-
tors,267 casting into doubt the general appropriateness of the standard
they attempted to set.
As noted earlier, the exclusive-benefit-of-employees rule of IRC
section 401(a) encompasses considerations of the expected safety and
yield on a pension fund's investments as well as the traditional ques-
tions of loyalty. Michael Leibig implies that under Revenue Ruling
70-536,268 the Internal Revenue Service relaxed the original strict
view of the statutory language and the regulation with respect to the
return that must be sought from investments of trust assets.269 This
Revenue Ruling, however, does not appear to provide sufficient au-
thority for the trustees of a public pension fund to make trade-offs
between a "prudent" rate of return on trust assets and other benefits
not directly related to the financial health of the pension fund.
Revenue Ruling 70-536 involved a trust exempt from federal in-
come taxation by virtue of IRC section 501(c)(17) rather than as a
result of qualification under section 401(a). Section 501(c)(17) ex-
empts trusts for payment of supplemental unemployment compensa-
tion benefits if, among other things, it is impossible under the
applicable benefits plan "for any part of the corpus or income to be
264. See, e.g., In re Will of Newhoff, 107 Misc. 2d 589, 435 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sur. Ct.
1980).
265. E.g., Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Schools for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (dictum). See also J. McLAUGHLIN,
INVESTING AS PRUDENT EXPERT, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE 23-29 (1975).
266. E.g., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390
(Ct. C1. 1975).
267. See In re Soss's Estate, 71 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sur. Ct. 1947) (trustee invested in
government bonds yielding two percent rather than two and one-half percent solely
because he was annoyed at the beneficiary).
268. 1970-2 C.B. 120.
269. Leibig, supra note 12, at 388. See also M. LEIBIG, supra note 255, at 37.
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. . . used for, or diverted to, any purpose other than the providing of
supplemental unemployment compensation benefits" prior to satis-
faction of all liabilities of the plan pertaining to its participants. The
language of this provision is identical to that used in section
401(a)(2). Therefore, interpretations of this section may be, but are
not necessarily, indicative of the meaning of section 401(a)(2).
The persons making the request which resulted in Revenue Ruling
70-536 proposed to amend a supplemental unemployment benefits
plan to allow the trust to invest some of its funds in low-risk invest-
ments which would "further projects providing community and so-
cial benefits" ' but which were expected to yield a lower rate of
return than what might otherwise be available for similar investments
in the market place.
The Internal Revenue Service concluded that adoption of the pro-
posed amendment would not affect the trust's exemption under sec-
tion 501(c)(17). The Service gave two reasons to support its
conclusion. First, under the applicable regulations, trust fund invest-
ments were "permitted to the extent allowed by local law" because
the statute contained "no specific limitations with respect to invest-
ments which may be made by trustees of [exempt] trusts."27  This
provision is contained in identical language in the regulations appli-
cable to section 401(a).272 Secondly, although the proposed amend-
ment expanded the factors that could be considered by the trust in
formulating its investment policy, the amendment did not affect the
purpose of the trust, which remained the provision of supplemental
unemployment compensation benefits.27 3 One should note, more-
over, that the regulations under section 501(c)(17) do not include any
provision that parallels the regulation, which excludes from the per-
missible purposes of a section 401(a) trust "all objects or aims not
solely designed for the proper satisfaction of all liabilities to employ-
ees or their beneficiaries. 274
Although the position taken in Revenue Ruling 70-536 is consis-
tent with the general discussion of "primary purpose" contained in
270. 1970-2 C.B. 120. The amendment was subject to approval by both the em-
ployer and the union, which had negotiated the supplemental benefits plan under a
collective bargaining agreement.
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(17)-2(h), T.D. 6972, 1968-2 C.B. 222, 229.
272. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(i), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 225.
273. Rev. Rul. 70-536, 1970-2 C.B. 120.
274. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(3), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 226.
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Revenue Ruling 69-494,275 the Revenue Ruling governing invest-
ments in employer securities, it is not consistent with the strict arm's
length requirements for purchases of employer securities established
by that ruling.2 7 6 It is also inconsistent with the section 401(a) re-
quirement that the trust's exclusive purpose must be payment of ben-
efits to the participants and beneficiaries. While Revenue Ruling 70-
536 does not appear to have been cited by any subsequent revenue
rulings or cases, Revenue Ruling 69-494 has been cited and followed
extensively.
When there are successive beneficiaries to a trust, additional fac-
tors, stemming from the fiduciary's duty of impartiality, must be con-
sidered in determining what return on investment is prudent. When
one beneficiary is entitled to receive the income of an express trust
during his life and on his death another will receive the principal, the
interests of the two beneficiaries are necessarily antagonistic in many
respects. The trustee's duty is to administer the trust to maintain a
fair balance between them.277 The trustee may not overemphasize
preservation of the trust property to the detriment of its current pro-
ductivity.278 Nor may he invest it in wasting assets or property that is
likely to depreciate in value, although current income may be high.
When the trust corpus includes assets that are rapidly depreciating or
being depleted, the trustee must provide for amortization of the prin-
cipal by allocating to assets a portion of the "income" realized cur-
rently279 or selling those assets and investing in property that will
both yield a reasonable income and maintain the value of the
principal.280
The potential for divided loyalties that trustees of a pension fund
275. 1969-2 C.B. 88.
276. See supra text accompanying note 229.
277. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'dmem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Mendelson's Will, 46 Misc. 2d
960, 261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sur. Ct. 1965); In re Dickson, 38 Misc. 2d 678, 237 N.Y.S.2d
572 (Sur. Ct. 1963). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (1959); 3 A.
SCOTT, supra note 12, § 232 at 1895.
278. In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (195 1). See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 240 (1959); 3 A. Scor, supra note 12, § 240.
279. In re Hottinger, 115 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
280. Id; In re Haldeman, 208 Misc. 419 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1955). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 239 (1959). Cf. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PRomT CORP. L. § 513(d)
(1970) (permits the inclusion in income of "so much of the realized appreciation as
the board [of directors] may deem prudent").
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face is accentuated by the fact that the participants are overlapping as
well as successive beneficiaries. The pension fund simultaneously in-
cludes current employees and retirees as participants. There is no
one point at which the benefits of the trust are transferred from one
group of beneficiaries to another because of the continuous influx of
participants and flow of participants from the employee group into
the retiree group. Within each group, the relative interests of various
participants in current income from, and capital appreciation of, the
assets vary because of the range of retirement dates and life expectan-
cies of those participants. It seems safe, however, to conclude that
when the yield on fixed income instruments may not both provide a
reasonable return on investment and cover the value lost through in-
flation, trustees, in order to deal impartially with all participants, pre-
sumably should invest part of the corpus in investments with
potential for appreciation of capital. This is particularly true in an
inflationary economy.
The need to achieve higher returns through capital appreciation, as
well as income from public pension fund investments, has been used
by some as an argument for the propriety of investments in small
businesses and venture capital investments.281 Investments in new
and small businesses usually involve greater risks than securities in
which public pension funds traditionally invest. Under current for-
mulations and interpretations of the prudent person standard, higher
potential return will not justify an investment that fails to satisfy the
safety component of that standard.282
3. Diversification
One factor, widely considered in making investment decisions and
mandatory under ERISA, 8 3 PEPPRA284 and the common law of
several states,285 is diversification of the investments in a trust portfo-
281. Committee on Governmental Employees, A Path to Increased Worker Bene-
fits and Economic Revitalization, Hearing Before the New York State Assembly 25
(Sept. 12, 1979); GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, supra note 4, at
7-23, 40-42; GOVERNOR'S PUBLIC INVESTMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 35-42,
46-49; L. LITVAK, supra note 8, at 31-34.
282. Note, The Regulation of Riky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603, 615, 619
(1970).
283. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).
284. S. 2105, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1204(a)(3) (1981); S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(a)(3) (1981).
285. Professor Scott lists nine states as having imposed liability on a trustee for
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lio. The purpose of diversification is to distribute the risk of loss
more widely, thereby minimizing the risk of large losses.286
ERISA and PEPPRA mandate diversification of pension trust as-
sets unless the responsible plan fiduciaries can show why their failure
to diversify was prudent.28 7 No percentage guidelines are contained
in either statute, or in the legislative history or regulations for ER-
ISA. Fiduciaries subject to ERISA are required to consider the facts
and circumstances of each case, including:
(1) the purposes of the plan; (2) the amount of plan assets; (3) fi-
nancial and industrial conditions; (4) the type of investment,
whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise;
(5) distribution as to geographical location; (6) distribution as to
industries; and (7) the dates of maturity.2"8
Diversification is apparently not mandatory in New York289 and
some other jurisdictions. 290 Whether or not a state requires diversifi-
cation of investments, it is the common law view that the prudence of
each individual investment is weighed separately and that gains from
one investment may not be used to excuse losses from another, im-
prudent investment.291 Consequently, a fiduciary in a state adhering
to this common law principle is not permitted to diversify among in-
failing to diversify: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Jersey, Tennessee and Wisconsin. 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, § 228.
286. Id
287. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C); S. 2105, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1204(a)(3) (1981); S.
2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(a)(3) (1981); H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 304 (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 76, at 4571.
288. H.R. RP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 76, at 4571.
289. Lower New York courts have often stated that diversification is not required
by New York law. E.g., In re Mendelson's Will, 46 Misc. 2d 960, 967, 261 N.Y.S.2d
525, 535 (Sur. Ct. 1965); In re First Nat'l Bank, 25 N.Y.S.2d 221, 225 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(not imprudent to invest 68% of trust assets in New York Central Railroad stock and
80% in railroad stocks). On the other hand, at least one lower court has stated in
dictum that diversification of a trust's investments is required. Cobb v. Gramatan
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 261 A.D. 1086,26 N.Y.S.2d 917, reargument denied, 262 A.D.
745, 28 N.Y.S.2d 157, appealgranted, 262 A.D. 861, 29 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1941).
The New York Court of Appeals has acknowledged that an investment decision may
be properly based in part on considerations of diversification, but it has not ruled
directly on the question of whether fiduciaries must consider diversification in making
all investment decisions. In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d
700, 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974).
290. See 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 12, § 228.
291. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 90 (1869).
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vestments that individually are of less than a prudent level of safety
in a belief either that they will yield higher returns or that they will
decrease the risk of the portfolio as a whole.2 92 In contrast, the De-
partment of Labor has interpreted ERISA as adopting a standard
whereby prudence is determined by considering the portfolio in its
entirety rather than investment by investment.293 Diversification and
this "whole portfolio standard" traditionally have been viewed as
separate and distinct issues. However, if the investment managers of
the largest pension systems are required by state or federal law to
diversify investments and simultaneously to account for the prudence
of each individual investment,294 they might not find a sufficient
number and dollar value of prudent investments to permit the re-
quired diversification. This would be particularly true if the types of
investments are limited by a legal list.295
4. Exigent Circumstances
When safety and yield are not clearly established, the authorities
have been willing to allow consideration of other factors to establish
the prudence of the proposed investment only in the presence of exi-
gent circumstances.
The New York Court of Appeals appears to have accepted one
type of indirect benefit in City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith .296 A
trustee sought guidance from the court in the early years of the post-
1929 depression concerning his power to negotiate a temporary re-
duction of rent for commercial real property held by the trust. He
sought the reduction to prevent the tenant under a twenty-year lease
from abandoning the premises. The court implicitly recognized the
292. See Trustees of Hanover College v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., Civ.
No. 7l-C686, slip op. (S.D. Ind. 1971); Bines, Modern Portfolio 7heory andInvestment
Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 763-65
(1976).
293. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b) (1982). Another factor that is always proper for
pension fund trustees to consider is the liquidity of the invested assets in light of the
cash flow needs of the pension fund. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(B) (1982).
294. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 29, 59 A.2d 24, 33,
36-37 (1948) (trustee will be surcharged for losses resulting from failure to diversify
sufficiently investments of trust even though trust as a whole showed a profit); 3 A.
SCoTT, supra note 12, §§ 213.1, 228.
295. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 197; Hamilton,
Johnston & Co., supra note 54, at 25-27; Murphy, supra note 13, at 236.
296. 263 N.Y. 292, 189 N.E. 222 (1934).
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possible propriety of a rent reduction under those circumstances,
holding that the trustee must seek the court's approval for such a
modification of the lease.297
In Drake v. Crane,298 the court permitted trustees of a trust consist-
ing largely of commercial property in a deteriorating area of St.
Louis to "invest" funds earmarked "to guard against loss or other
contingencies" by paying a bonus to developers to induce their con-
struction of a new hotel in the immediate vicinity. Obviously, this
payment to the hotel developers earned no direct income for the trust
and was at considerable risk because the increased property values
sought for the trust property were speculative. Nevertheless, the
court held that the payment was a legitimate investment which re-
sulted in a "direct benefit" to the trust and was a proper exercise of
the trustees' power under the trust instrument to prevent "losses by
shrinkage." 299
In Blankenship v. Boyle,3"° a case discussed earlier, the court did
not reject the union's argument that purchase of the utility stocks
would benefit the pension fund by increasing the amount of coal
mined by the union and the employers' contributions to the pension
fund. The court simply held that the trustees had violated their
fiduciary obligations, because their primary purpose in purchasing
the stock was to benefit the union rather than the fund.30 1 This hold-
ing implies that the same investment, if primarily intended to benefit
the pension fund, might have been a prudent exercise of the trustees'
discretion.30 2
Withers v. Teachers'Retirement System 30 3 clearly endorses the con-
sideration of indirect economic benefits to a trust. This was an action
by current and retired participants of the Teachers' Retirement Sys-
297. Id at 297, 189 N.E. at 224.
298. 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990 (1895).
299. Id at 107, 29 S.W. at 995-96.
300. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
301. 329 F. Supp. at 1106.
302. In response to a recent request for an advisory opinion, the Department of
Labor pointed out that indirect financial benefits to an employee benefit trust from
increased employer contributions may be too speculative and uncertain of measure-
ment to be considered in comparing the overall yield from the investment designed to
result in the increased contributions with the yield of comparable market investments.
Annuity Fund of Electrical Industry of Long Island, Dep't of Labor Op. Letter (Mar.
15, 1982).
303. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dmem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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tem for the City of New York against trustees of the retirement sys-
tem. They sought money damages for breaches of fiduciary duty, an
injunction against additional purchases of New York City and MAC
securities by the system, and a declaration of unconstitutionality of
recently enacted state legislation (Chapter 890).104 Chapter 890 au-
thorized the trustees of certain New York City retirement systems,
including Teachers', to consider, in connection with investments in
New York City and MAC obligations, "in addition to other appro-
priate factors recognized by law,"3 ° s the extent to which such invest-
ments would aid the City in fulfilling its obligations as the major
contributor to the retirement systems and the ultimate guarantor of
benefits from the retirement systems and would protect the sources of
funds for participants' retirement benefits .3° The court reviewed the
standards of prudence applicable in New York State to investment
decisions by fiduciaries, the normal investment policy of the retire-
ment system's trustees and the Comptroller as their investment agent
to invest only in high quality securities and to maintain a diversified
portfolio, and the testimony of the individual trustees that they would
not have purchased the New York City obligations under normal cir-
cumstances. The court then stated, "What determined the issue for
the trustees was the specter of the City's bankruptcy, and, accord-
ingly, the question becomes the extent to which this was a legitimate
concern in the making of their investment decision."3 °7 It concluded
that, "under the unique circumstances presented-in which the sur-
vival of 'the fund as an entity' necessarily achieved prominence-the
trustees' investment decision was such as to fulfill their fiduciary obli-
gations to the [retirement system]."3 8
Some commentators have echoed this emphasis and concluded
that, had there been no emergency or imminent threat to the retire-
ment systems' viability, the trustees would not have been justified in
considering any factors other than the traditional factors of safety,
return and diversification.3' 9 The trustees' reasons for purchasing the
New York City securities, accepted by the court as valid, focused pre-
304. 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 890, as amended by 1978 N.Y. Laws, cs. 488 & 785.
305, 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 890 § 1(a).
306. Id
307. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. at 1255.
308. Id at 1259.
309 Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1363; Langbein & Posner, supra note
14, at 101-02.
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cisely on the payment of pension benefits to the participants, the
"sole benefit" or purpose for which the pension fund had been estab-
lished. The questionable aspect of their investment decision arose
from the risk associated with the purchase of New York City obliga-
tions, when other investment securities available to the retirement
systems satisfied all traditional investment criteria of prudence, in-
cluding safety.
The question arises whether enactment of Chapter 890110 was nec-
essary for the trustees to consider the City's status as contributor and
guarantor of the retirement systems and whether the authorization it
provided was necessary for the Withers court's conclusion that the
trustees acted prudently. In its opinion, the court described the main
provisions of Chapter 890 when setting out the facts of the case.31'
The court concluded that the trustees' insistence upon passage of the
statute tended to show that their actions were motivated primarily by
concern for the pension fund rather than to secure their own indem-
nification, as alleged by plaintiffs.312 These are the only times the
court discussed Chapter 890 in the portion of the opinion relating to
the prudence of the trustees' investment decision. This indicates that
enactment of the statute may not have been necessary for a finding
that the trustees' decisions were prudent. In the portion of the opin-
ion in which the court discusses the constitutionality of Chapter 890,
310. The major provisions of Chapter 890 will expire on December 31, 1983. The
City indemnification of trustees provided by § 2 of Chapter 890 does not, however,
diminish. See 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 890 § 5. The provisions that terminate include:
1) the subsection authorizing the trustees of New York City pension funds to purchase
andhold as investments obligations of the City and MAC, without regard to consider-
ations of diversification or percentage of asset limitations under the legal list; 2) the
subsection authorizing the trustees to consider, when investing in or holding City or
MAC obligations, the impact of their investments on the City as contributor to the
pension funds and guarantor of their benefits; and 3) the subsection granting the pen-
sion fund's power to borrow money and pledge their assets as collateral for the pur-
pose of purchasing New York State or City or MAC obligations. Although the
percentages of the New York City retirement systems' portfolios that these securities
constitute have been reduced through the retirement of serial bonds and sales of
MAC bonds, the expiration of the trustees' authority to hold the City and MAC obli-
gations may make the issue of whether or not the Withers court relied on this legisla-
tion one of considerable importance for these trustees.
311. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. at 1253.
312. Id at 1259. Moreover, since this indemnification would have been provided
by the City of New York, that provision of Chapter 890 should be regarded as creat-
ing anavenue for City and ultimately state support of the City's retirement systems if
all else failed.
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however, the court stresses that "Chapter 890 was enacted as an inte-
gral part of the financial plan to stave off the City's default." '313 It
also states that "the statutepermits the trustees to protect a source of
their funds through discretionary purchases of City obligations with-
out numerical limit." '314 Thus, considering the Withers decision as a
whole, it is not possible to say whether the trustees' decisions to
purchase and hold the New York City obligations would have satis-
fied the prudent person standard absent the authorization provided
by Chapter 890.
The letters from the trustees of NYCERS and the Teachers' Retire-
ment System that requested a ruling from the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice in connection with their purchase of City and MAC securities315
also described the financial crisis facing the City of New York and
the assertions of City and state officials that purchase of the MAC
and City securities was necessary to prevent the City's bankruptcy.
The Service relied upon these representations, as well as representa-
tions by the two retirement systems, that the proposed purchases of
MAC and City securities would reduce the risk of future reductions
in levels of benefits paid by the retirement systems to participants and
beneficiaries and the risk of termination or delay of the City's future
contributions to the retirement systems. In its second letter of intent
to rule, which covered several later purchases of securities by the re-
tirement systems, the Service also relied upon the trustees' represen-
tation that the New York State legislature had authorized the trustees
of City and state retirement systems to purchase securities of the City
and MAC without regard to the percentage of the retirement systems'
assets invested in such obligations.316 The letter also noted that the
legislature had authorized the trustees to consider the extent to which
investments in City and MAC obligations would aid the City in mak-
ing future contributions to the retirement systems and in acting as
guarantor for all pension benefits and would protect the sources of
funds for the retirement benefits.31 7
As shown above, the private letter ruling issued to Detroit by the
Internal Revenue Service merely authorizes the Detroit pension fund
trustees to consider the economic circumstances of Detroit in negoti-
313, Id at 1260.
314. Id (emphasis added).
315. See supra notes 253-54 and text accompanying notes 247-54.
316. On file with the Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law.
317. 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 890 § 1.
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ating the terms of the bonds to be accepted by the pension funds.
The facts described in the letter ruling show that the pension funds
were not likely to receive a large portion of the required employer
contributions unless they accepted part of the contributions in the
form of debt obligations.
Thus, all but one318 of the existing authorities explicitly permitting
the consideration of benefits that are not directly involved in the
safety of and return to the trust fund can be explained by the factor of
necessity. In each of these cases the trustee only faced bad choices. It
might be possible to construct a theory that justifies and permits
trustees of public pension funds to consider indirect benefits in the
absence of necessity. Except for Revenue Ruling 70-536, which does
not appear to have been followed,3 19 there appears to be no support
for such a theory under existing statutory, judicial or administrative
law.
C. Prudence: The Exercise of Skill, Care and Caution
As stated above,320 prudence is a matter of conduct and a fiduci-
ary's exercise of skill, care and caution, especially in investigating the
benefits and detriments an investment may hold for the trust. Under
the law applicable to private trusts, a trustee is required to exercise
the degree of skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in
318. Even that case may be characterized as one of necessity for the national gov-
ernment. In re London's Estate, 104 Misc. 372, 171 N.Y.S. 981 (Sur. Ct. 1918), aft'd,
187 A.D. 952, 175 N.Y.S. 910 (1st Dep't 1919), involved an action against trustees
under a trust instrument directing them to invest solely in bonds of United States
railroad corporations yielding at least four percent annually. The trustees had in-
vested part of the trust funds in four and one-half percent bonds of New York City
and three and one-half percent United States Liberty Loan bonds. The trustees were
surcharged for losses from the investment in New York City bonds but not for losses
from the Liberty Loan bonds.
[These are abnormal times. Our country is engaged in a great war, and needs
the undivided support, aid and loyalty of every citizen. Under these circum-
stances the court should not be bound by narrow and restricted rules of law and
construction in questions which affect the welfare of our country, but should ex-
ercise its best and widest discretion. The investment by the trustees in these Lib-
erty Loan bonds was in aid of our government in its hour of need, and they
should be commended rather than condemned therefor.
104 Misc. at 377, 171 N.Y.S. at 983.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 275-76.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
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making investment decisions.32' When appropriate, the trustee may
consult experts regarding the investment322 but he will still be held to
the same standard323 now codified in many states.324 It seems likely,
however, that a trustee or other fiduciary who is in fact more skillful,
experienced or otherwise knowledgable than the average prudent
person must exercise the skill he has.325
Under ERISA and both proposed versions of PEPPRA, trustees
are held to the standard of skill that "a prudent person acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 326 This lan-
guage appears to establish a standard of skill of an expert in making
pension investments. In a recent case, the court held that pension
fund trustees had a fiduciary duty under ERISA to obtain the quanti-
ty and quality of information about a proposed real estate loan that a
"reasonably competent real estate lender" would have obtained.327
The NYCERS trustees have delegated to the New York City
Comptroller,328 and the Comptroller has delegated to the Deputy
Comptroller, Asset Management,329 the power to make any invest-
ments the NYCERS trustees are authorized by law to make. The
Deputy Comptroller has engaged professional investment advisors to
advise him concerning various types of investments. The Deputy
Comptroller and his advisors are experts and, therefore, are held to
the standard of an expert under either the Insurance Regulations or
PEPPRA. The NYCERS trustees still may and do authorize particu-
lar investments directly. In such cases the degree of skill required of
321. In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76
(1869); 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 12, § 227.2.
322. Mills v. Bluestein, 275 N.Y. 317, 9 N.E.2d 944 (1937); 3 A. ScoTT, supra note
12, § 227.1.
323. In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
324. The prudent person standard for New York public pension funds is codified
in the Insurance Regulations. I 1 NYCRR § 136.6(a). See supra note 64.
325. See In re Easton's Estate, 178 Misc. 611, 35 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sur. Ct. 1942),
aft'd, 266 A.D. 713, 41 N.Y.S.2d 190 (4th Dep't 1943) (corporate trustee is expected to
use as high a degree of care as the most experienced individual).
326. S. 2106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(a)(2) (1981).
327. Donovan v. Mazzola, 2 E.B.C. 2115, 2125-26 (N.D. Cal. 1981). See also
Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 407 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Hawaii 1980).
328. Resolution of NYCERS Board of Trustees, Cal. No. R-93, Sept. 11, 1981.
This delegation is authorized by Naw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § E49-2.0(a) (1975).
329. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 94(a) (Supp. 1981).
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them probably would be higher under PEPPRA than under the In-
surance Regulations and the common law.
Trustees' duty of prudence requires them to investigate with care
each investment that they personally authorize.330 They must con-
sider both the past history and the future prospects of the investment
under consideration. Their duty of care requires trustees to consult
experts in fields where any trustee possesses no or limited expertise of
his own.33' Such experts may include appraisers, attorneys, bankers,
brokers, investment advisors and real estate specialists. Trustees may
rely upon each expert as to matters in which the expert possesses ex-
pertise and the trustees are inexperienced. Trustees should also take
into consideration whether the person giving them advice is disinter-
ested in the investment decision.332 They must not confuse proper
reliance upon the expertise of an advisor with the judgment concern-
ing prudence of the particular investment, which each trustee is him-
self bound to form.333 When personally authorizing investments,
each trustee must form his own opinion and act accordingly, lest he
improperly delegate his discretionary responsibilities as a
fiduciary. 34
Public pension fund trustees may be subjected to liability for losses
incurred by their funds through investments that they failed to inves-
tigate with the proper care. It has long been clear under the common
law that liability may be imposed upon a trustee if he fails to make a
proper investigation that would have disclosed that the investment
was imprudent or one which the trustee has no power to authorize.335
The duty of pension fund trustees to investigate with care planned
investments is most thoroughly explicated in the court of appeals and
330. In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
331. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 472-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
332. Id at 475; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 227.1.
333. In re Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sur. Ct. 1954); 3 A. ScoTT, supra note
12, § 227.3.
334. In re Osborn, 252 A.D. 438, 299 N.Y.S. 593 (2d Dep't 1937); In re Dickson,
38 Misc. 2d 678, 237 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sur. Ct. 1963). See 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 12,
§ 171; REFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
335. In re Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Cobb v. Gramatan
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1940), afd on other grounds, 261
A.D. 1086, 26 N.Y.S.2d 917, new trial denied, 262 A.D. 745, 28 N.Y.S.2d 157, leave to
appealgranted, 262 A.D. 861, 29 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1941).
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district court opinions in Donovan v. Bierwirth .336 This case involved
an action by the Secretary of Labor against three trustees of the pen-
sion fund established under ERISA for employees of the Grumman
Corporation.337 The LTV Corporation (LTV) made an unsolicited
tender offer for up to seventy percent of Grumman's stock, which the
directors of Grumman determined to resist. Prior to the tender offer
the pension plan held 525,000 shares of Grumman's outstanding
stock. The federal district court found that the three trustees of the
Grumman pension plan, who were all executive officers of Grum-
man, decided after a half-hour discussion attended only by the trust-
ees and in-house counsel for Grumman not to tender the shares
already held by the Grumman pension plan.338 Moreover, they
purchased, at an average price over fifty percent higher than the pre-
tender offer price, an additional 1,158,000 shares on behalf of the
Grumman pension plan.339
The district court held that the dual loyalties of each trustee to
Grumman and to its employees' pension plan created a potential con-
flict of interests, requiring the trustees to satisfy a higher standard of
care in their investigation of the contemplated investment.340 The
trustees' heightened obligation to act fairly required their independ-
ent investigation to be intensive, scrupulous, and "discharged with
the greatest degree of care that could be expected under all the cir-
cumstances by reasonable beneficiaries and participants of the
plan."34' Both courts declined to rule on whether the trustees, fol-
lowing a proper investigation, could have reasonably concluded that
the investment in the Grumman shares was prudent. But both found
that the trustees had failed to investigate carefully whether the newly
purchased Grumman securities were superior to other investments in
the marketplace or whether LTV's success in its tender offer would
have an adverse impact upon the Grumman pension plan.342 The
courts held that, because of the inadequacy of their investigation,
neither the prudence of the investment nor the trustees' good faith
336, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), afl'g 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
338. 538 F. Supp. at 466.
339. Id at 467.
340. Id at 469.
341, Id at 470; 680 F.2d at 272.
342. 538 F. Supp. at 473; 680 F.2d at 275-76.
19831
Washington University Open Scholarship
106 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:43
belief in the value of the investment could insulate them from liabil-
ity for the loss incurred by the pension plan as a result of the
investment. 3
4 3
A clear picture of the concrete steps that may be necessary for a
fiduciary to follow when he investigates a difficult investment oppor-
tunity may be gained by comparing the actions of the Grumman
trustees3 " with the investigation conducted by the trustees whose
conduct was challenged in Withers v. Teachers'Retirement System :34s
(1) The Grumman trustees spent only a few hours over a period
of two weeks investigating the Grumman plan's best interests.346 The
trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System devoted a significant
portion of their time, over a period of five to six months, to their
investigation.347
(2) The Grumman trustees' inquiry into the dangers presented to
the Grumman pension plan by the tender offer was not adequate. 348
The trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System met frequently with
the "City Comptroller and Corporation Counsel, to discuss the pro-
jected short-falls in the City's budget and the need for long-term
financial assistance." 349
(3) The record made by the Grumman trustees did not show how
the Grumman pension plan could have benefited from tendering its
Grumman stock to LTV.350 The trustees of the Teachers' Retirement
System believed the purchases of New York City obligations would
"insure the survival of the fund, and at a limited cost, since the
purchase of the bonds was in effect to be financed by the continuing
cash contributions from the City.1351
(4) The Grumman trustees did not explore alternatives for pro-
tecting the Grumman pension plan in the event the tender offer suc-
ceeded. They did not test the good faith of LTV's public promise not
to merge the Grumman plan with LTV's pension plans. Nor did they
investigate alternate methods of gaining the same benefits for the
343. 538 F. Supp. at 471; 680 F.2d at 276.
344. 680 F.2d at 270.
345. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
346. 538 F. Supp. at 466.
347. 447 F. Supp. at 1258-59.
348. 538 F. Supp. at 472-73.
349. 447 F. Supp. at 1251.
350. 538 F. Supp. at 472.
351. 447 F. Supp. at 1259.
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Grumman pension plan that they sought through the investment.352
The trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System resisted purchasing
the New York City securities until they were convinced that the
City-and the retirement systems-had no alternative.353 They also
conditioned their "investment in the City bonds on the enactment of
federal legislation providing for the seasonal financing needs of the
City" during the period the retirement systems would be purchasing
the New York City bonds, on state legislation concerning the legal
status and the security of the retirement systems' assets, and on pro-
curement of a ruling by the Internal Revenue Service or enactment of
federal legislation that would preserve the tax benefits of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries of the retirement systems.354
(5) The Grumman trustees did not solicit any expert financial ad-
vice on the effect that tendering its stock would have on the Grum-
man pension plan.3 5 The trustees of the Teachers' Retirement
System initiated meetings with officials of the Municipal Assistance
Corporation and independent consultants to review long-range plans
that were being developed to meet New York City's fiscal crisis.356
(6) The Grumman trustees did not consult independent outside
counsel with expertise in the issues. 35 7 The trustees of the Teachers'
Retirement System consulted outside counsel who gave them exten-
sive advice on the legal standards applicable to their investment deci-
sions and their consequences.358
352. 538 F. Supp. at 472-73.
353. 447 F. Supp. at 1252.
354. Id at 1253.
355, 538 F. Supp. at 472.
356. 447 F. Supp. at 1251.
357. 538 F. Supp. at 473.
358. 447 F. Supp. at 1255, 1258; Withers, 447 F. Supp. at 1255 (citing W. Joseph-
son, T. Veal and G. Lander, Draft Memorandum, Oct. 24, 1975, on file with the
Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law). Compare the requirement in Donovan v.
Bierwirth for independent counsel with the discussion of the status of a public officer
lawyer statutorily designated as counsel to both the public employer and the public
pension plan, supra at notes 181-98.
The Grumman trustees also failed to inquire about the transaction costs of the large
and unusual transactions they authorized, 538 F. Supp. at 475, and the limited invest-
ment advice upon which they did rely was out-of-date, hurriedly prepared, addressed
to a different set of circumstances applicable to a different investor, provided by an
investment advisor with a potential conflict of interests requiring greater scrutiny of
the advice by the trustees, unsupported by the primary data available to the trustees,
and uninterpreted by any representative of the investment advisor, id at 474.
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Finally, the obligation of pension fund trustees to make investment
decisions prudently requires them to act with caution. Careful in-
dependent investigation of the basis of each decision represents one
aspect of this caution. Another aspect is represented by the emphasis,
under almost all circumstances, on the preservation of the trust
corpus as the primary investment consideration. In making invest-
ment decisions a fiduciary is required to invest with more caution
than a person who is responsible simply for his own well-being. He is
"charged with the responsibility of recognizing that the kind of in-
vestment which may be appropriate for an individual investor seek-
ing to reap substantial profits is not suitable for a trust." '59
The investment analyses required by proposals for targeted invest-
ments will always pose questions concerning the value and specula-
tiveness of the intended benefits to the pension fund and may often
pose questions of the motivation or intent of its trustees in authoriz-
ing such investments. Public pension fund trustees possess considera-
ble discretion in making investment decisions and must exercise that
discretion by forming their own judgments.36 If challenged, they
may find it is difficult for a court to evaluate the prudence and loyalty
of their investment decision as of the time of the decision rather than
from hindsight unless they made a clear record of their diligence and
care in investigating the investment, the benefits they believed were
sufficiently certain to form a basis for their decision, and their moti-
vation for authorizing the investment.
Consequently, it is extremely important that fiduciaries preserve a
carefully documented and adequately reasoned investment record
whenever they are faced with an unusual or complex investment pro-
posal. The record may include minutes or transcripts of trustee meet-
ings, written recommendations and reports supplied by responsible
governmental officials, independent investment advisors and special
counsel, and records of the data analyzed and publications or experts
consulted in determining whether a proposed investment is likely to
have its desired effect. On the other hand, evidence that a fiduciary
based his decision on self-interest or "ignored well-documented, fac-
tual indications concerning the impact of an investment on any inter-
359. In re Will of Newhoff, 107 Misc. 2d 589, 593-94, 435 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (Sur.
Ct. 1980). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment e (1959); 3 A.
ScoTT, supra note 12, § 227 at 1806, § 227.3.
360. Mills v. Bluestein, 275 N.Y. 317,9 N.E.2d 944 (1937); In re Osborn, 252 A.D.
438, 299 N.Y.S. 593 (2d Dep't 1937); 3 A. ScoTw, supra note 12, § 227.3.
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est of plan beneficiaries or participants will provide a valid basis for
challenging fiduciary conduct." 36'
V. INVESTMENT PROPOSALS
The Comptroller of The City of New York has submitted to the
trustees of NYCERS and the other City employee retirement systems
three specific proposals for investments designed to provide benefits
to the City as well as to NYCERS.362 A review of these proposals
will illustrate some of the issues this article discusses.
The first investment recommended by the Comptroller involved
mortgage pass-through securities guaranteed by the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA) and backed by pools of mort-
gages on one-to-four family homes located within New York City or
adjacent counties. Thus, these securities were "targeted" to the New
York City area. They were to be issued by GNMA-approved issuers.
The guarantee of the securities by GNMA entitles them to the pledge
of the "full faith and credit of the United States. 36 3 NYCERS had
invested in GNMA mortgage pass-through securities, not restricted
to mortgages on New York properties, prior to the Comptroller's rec-
ommendation. The targeted GNMA securities are approved legal list
investments for NYCERS.3 6
While it includes the divergent goal of aiding housing in the New
York City area, this investment should not be regarded as sacrificing
361. Leibig, supra note 12, at 390. Accord Atnally, The Investment Responsibilities
of Fiduciaries: Implications of the Spitzer Decision, 1975 TR. & EsT. 286, 289.
362. "Investments Targeted to New York City," memorandum from Harrison J.
Goldin, New York City Comptroller, to Trustees of the New York City Retirement
Systems (Oct. 3, 1980); "Targeted Investments-Phase II," memorandum from Harri-
son J. Goldin, New York City Comptroller, to Trustees of the New York City Retire-
ment Systems (Jan. 26, 1982), both on file with the Journal of Urban and
Contemporary Law.
This discussion is based on several memoranda that the City sabmitted to the trust-
ees of the New York City retirement systems and conversations with the Deputy
Comptroller, Asset Management and the Counsel for Finance to the Comptroller.
No independent investigation of the facts has been made.
363. 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (Supp. V 1981).
364. Subdivision 1 of§ 235 of the N.Y. Banking Law authorizes NYCERS invest-
ments in securities for which the "faith of the United States is pledged to provide for
the payment of the interest and principal." These targeted GNMA securities also
appear to satisfy the criteria for mortgage pass-through certificates secured by mort-
gages on one-to-four family residences in New York State authorized by N.Y. RE-
TIRE & Soc, SEc. LAw § 177-c (McKinney Supp. 1982).
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any yield or safety required by the prudent person standard. Pay-
ment of the principal and interest on targeted GNMA securities is
secured by the faith and credit of the United States and yields of
these securities generally range from one-fourth percent to one per-
cent above those of equivalent duration Treasury bonds.365 It is un-
likely, therefore, that their safety or yield could be challenged
successfully under the prudent person standard applicable to
NYCERS and other public pension fund investments. Consequently,
such targeted GNMA mortgage securities have become an attractive
way for trustees and managers of public pension funds to invest lo-
cally without risking violation of the prudent person standard. Thus,
this investment meets the prudent person and other legal standards
and also serves other purposes. 366
The second program that the Comptroller proposed involves con-
ventional mortgage pass-through securities to be issued by banks or
savings and loan associations within New York State and backed by
mortgages on one-to-four family residences located in the state. As
thus structured, these New York-targeted mortgage securities appear
to be authorized under the legal liSt.3 6 7
The Comptroller's proposal provided for the payment of principal
of and interest on the targeted conventional mortgage securities to be
100% insured by private mortgage insurers. This insurance is neither
required nor explicitly authorized by the relevant legal list provision.
The legislative history of this provision, however, indicates the legis-
lature probably assumed such mortgage pass-through securities
would be insured to at least five percent of the total indebtedness
represented by the securities.3 68 Consequently, to the extent these
365. Memorandum from Harrison J. Goldin to Trustees of New York City Re-
tirement Systems (Oct. 3, 1980).
366. See supra text accompanying note 15.
367. See N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. Sac. LAW § 177-c (McKinney Supp. 1982).
368. The session law which enacted § 177-c of the Retirement and Social Security
Law also amended the New York Insurance Law. 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 672 § 2. The
amendment enlarged the definition of mortgage guaranty insurance to include insur-
ance on pools of mortgage loans and excluded such insurance from the limitation of
reinsurance coverage to 25% of the indebtedness. 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 672 § 2 (codi-
fied at N.Y. INs. LAW § 302(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982)). A memorandum from the
New York State Teachers' Retirement System concerning this legislation advised the
Governor's counsel that the retirement system had no objection to enactment of the
legislation but recommended that "the approval memorandum, if one [were] issued,
should specify unequivocally that each mortgage pass-through certificate shall be in-
sured by mortgage insurance." Memorandum from H.N. Langitz, Executive Direc-
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targeted conventional mortgage securities might not be considered
prudent without at least five percent mortgage pool insurance, the
mortgage insurance could be considered to be auxiliary to the legal
list even if not actually part of it.
If, as anticipated, these targeted conventional mortgage securities
are rated AA or AAA by Standard and Poor's36 9 and yield approxi-
mately one-half percent above similar current coupon GNMA securi-
ties, the safety and yield on these investments are likely to withstand
any challenge under the prudent person standard. Therefore, this in-
vestment, while arguably divergent, does not sacrifice yield or safety.
The third investment proposal of the New York City Comptroller
involved construction and development (C&D) financing for real es-
tate projects in New York City. Under this proposal mortgages on
the projects secure the C&D loans. As is usual for C&D loans, the
funds for each C&D project will be advanced to the real estate devel-
oper as the architect or engineer certifies that specified stages of work
are completed. Thus, the value of the underlying security will remain
roughly proportionate to the loan principal outstanding. Unlike con-
ventional C&D financing, each C&D loan in this program also wil
tor, New York State Teachers' Retirement System, to Richard A. Brown, Counsel to
the Governor 3 (June 25, 1980). A letter to the Governor's counsel from the Chair-
man of the New York State Permanent Commission on Public Employee Pension and
Retirement Systems states:
[Tihe standard mortgage guaranty insurance coverage transacted in this state
provides coverage at the rate of 5% of the original indebtedness and . . . such
coverage is diminished by the payment of losses. . . . The last three lines in the
bill relating to removing limitations on coverage, appears [sic] to have no reason-
mg in view of the foregoing.
Letter from James F. Regan, Chairman, Permanent Commission on Public Employee
Pension and Retirement Systems, to Richard Brown, Counsel to the Governor (June
27, 1980).
These documents can be found in the bill jacket for the session law that enacted
these companion provisions of the Retirement and Social Security Law and the Insur-
ance Law. They evidence a general industry practice of partially insuring targeted
conventional mortgage securities. The simultaneous amendment of the Retirement
and Social Security Law and the Insurance Law implies an expectation of the legisla-
ture that from 5% to 25% or more of the total indebtedness in such mortgage securities
would or might be insured. While the mortgage insurance contemplated by the
Comptroller's proposal technically may not be included in the legal list provision that
authorizes the targeted conventional mortgage securities, there does appear to be a
statutory connection between the legal list provision and the provision authorizing
mortgage insurance on the pool of mortgages.
369. It is not known whether Standard and Poor's would give a AA rating to these
securities in the absence of some or all of the insurance discussed above.
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be secured by an irrevocable standby letter of credit from Chemical
Bank under which NYCERS may demand immediate issuance of a
certificate of deposit by the bank upon the borrower's default.
One legal list provision applicable to NYCERS authorizes invest-
ments in conventional mortgages that are guaranteed by a New York
State bank or trust company with a net worth greater than $500 mil-
lion.370 The only element of this provision that the proposed C&D
investment program does not clearly satisfy3 71 is the requirement that
the mortgages be "guaranteed" by the qualifying state bank. This
requirement raises the question of whether a letter of credit issued by
a state bank constitutes a guaranty by that bank. After taking into
consideration the purpose and function of a letter of credit as well as
the lack of formal requirements for a "guaranty" under New York
State law, it appears that the Chemical Bank letter of credit should
satisfy the guaranty requirement 372 and that the proposed C&D in-
370. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 177(3) (McKinney 1971).
371. "Conventional mortgage" is defined in the statute to include "any single
bond and mortgage or note and mortgage constituting a first lien upon real estate...
not insured by the federal housing administrator. . . or guaranteed by the United
States under the provisions of the national housing act." N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC.
LAW § 176(2) (McKinney 1971). Under documentation developed by the Comptrol-
ler's staff, each C&D loan is evidenced by a note and secured by a mortgage constitut-
ing a first lien upon the property. Chemical Bank is a state bank. CHEMICAL BANK,
1981 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K, 1, 8 (1982). It has a net worth greater than
$500 million. CHEMICAL BANK, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT To SHAREHOLDERS 44
(1982).
372. A guaranty is generally defined as a promise to pay the debt of another,
collateral to his primary contract and expressly conditioned upon his default. L.
SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP § 14 (1950). A letter of credit, as ordinarily employed in sales
transactions, differs somewhat from a guaranty, although it has the same economic
effect. The letter of credit is a promise to honor demands for payment upon compli-
ance with the conditions specified in the credit, usually the presentation of one or
more documents. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103 (McKinney 1964). The letter of credit to be
issued for each C&D loan by Chemical Bank provides that, upon submission of proof
of the borrower's default on the note, Chemical Bank will issue a certificate of deposit
to the City Comptroller on behalf of NYCERS for the outstanding principal and
accrued interest. Thus conditioned upon the borrower's default, it appears the Chem-
ical Bank letters of credit would function like absolute guaranties of payment. See 57
N.Y. JUR., Suretyship and Guaranty §§ 20, 21 (rev. 1967). Since a guaranty need not
take a particular form nor employ particular words, such as "guaranty" or "guaran-
tee," id § 15, the Chemical Bank letters of credit appear to satisfy the legal list re-
quirement that "conventional mortgages" in which NYCERS invests be
"guaranteed" by a state bank. Indeed, it has been said that the standby letter of credit
constitutes a more solid and certain form of repayment commitment than a guaran-
tee. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit, 89 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 1, and
28, cols. 1-4.
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vestment probably is on NYCERS' legal list. In addition, the certifi-
cate of deposit that would be substituted for the C&D loan if
NYCERS ever draws upon the letter of credit is on NYCERS' legal
list.37 3
Assuming the equivalence of the letters of credit to a guaranty, this
investment, although targeted to New York City, probably would not
be considered to be concessionary. The basic factors upon which the
NYCERS trustees must rely in assessing the prudence of C&D loan
program investments, assuming the authorization of the letter of
credit by the legal list, are of the type routinely considered by the
trustees and their investment advisors. Each letter of credit to be is-
sued by Chemical Bank will be irrevocable and the certificate of de-
posit that NYCERS would receive upon a borrower's default will be
an unconditional promise to pay the outstanding loan balance. The
safety of these investments is dependent on Chemical Bank's
creditworthiness. The loan and certificate of deposit are each ex-
pected to yield roughly one and one-half percent above equivalent
duration United States Treasury securities.
In addition to being a statutorily appointed member of the
NYCERS board of trustees,374 the New York City Comptroller exer-
cises investment powers of the NYCERS trustees under a statutorily
authorized delegation.375 Consequently, any potential conflict of in-
terests that may arise from the Comptroller's dual role as author of
these investment proposals and as a trustee responsible for forming
an independent investment judgment of the proposal should be
deemed to be statutorily sanctioned.376
VI. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The fourth section of this article establishes that public pension
fund trustees have authority to relax the prudent person requirements
of safety and return only in exigent circumstances and only to protect
retirement benefits. Not surprisingly, therefore, at least some public
officers have sought explicit legislative authorization. This was true
in 1975 when New York City officials asked the trustees of NYCERS,
the Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York and other
373. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235 (12-a)(b) (McKinney 1971).
374. See supra text accompanying note 151.
375. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45 and 152-53.
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New York City employee pension systems to purchase its securities
and those of MAC.37 7 Certainly, the trustees' insistence upon first
receiving state and federal legislative authorization to consider the
effect of the City's status as contributor of funds and guarantor of
benefits was in keeping with the law of private trusts. That law re-
quires trustees to seek court approval before making an investment
that deviates in any respect from the safety and yield requirements of
the prudent person standard. 378
Proposals for legislation to expand the investment authority of
public pension fund trustees fall into several categories. There have
been proposals to drop the legal list and to rely solely upon the pru-
dent person rule for regulating investment decisions of state and mu-
nicipal pension fund trustees.379 A related approach would be for
states to repeal their own statutory constraints on investment of mu-
nicipal and state pension funds, enacting in their place legislation
identical to the fiduciary provisions of PEPPRA and ERISA.311 Still
other proposals either permit investment in specified divergent in-
vestments38 1 or direct that a specified portion of the public pension
377. See supra note 106 and text accompanying notes 104-05 and 303-14.
378. Curtiss v. Brown, 29 IM. 201, 230 (1862); Will of Pace, 93 Misc. 2d 969, 400
N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sur. Ct. 1977); Davison v. Duke University, 282 N.C. 676, 194 S.E.2d
761 (1973); 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 12, §§ 167, 167.1.
379. E.g., GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, supra note 4. See
A. 7993, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. N.Y. (1981); NEW YORK PERMANENT COMM'N ON PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, REPORT TO GOVERNOR AND
MEMBERS OF LEGISLATURE (1982). So far, the legal list has been "repealed" in New
York only to the extent of a five percent "basket" for investments that are subject only
to the percentage limitations on investments in single enterprises and a new codifica-
tion of the prudent person rule. 1982 N.Y. Laws ch. 717 § 2. See also S. 6227, 1981-
82 Reg. Sess. N.Y. (1981).
380. See supra note 117.
381. In 1981 the Comptroller of New York City suggested that a provision be
added to the legal list for New York State and City pension funds that would author-
ize the trustees of those funds to make "geographically targeted investments." "Geo-
graphically targeted investments" are defined to include all investments targeted to
the City or the state, which a) are in a business that does business in and employs
residents of the targeted area, has the potential for job expansion, and will contribute
to the targeted area's economic well-being; b) will assist in the promotion or preserva-
tion of small businesses in the targeted area; c) will improve its economic viability; or
d) will tend to increase the supply of mortgage funds and housing in the targeted area.
The proposal would limit the aggregate amount of geographically targeted invest-
ments of each pension fund to two percent of the market value of the fund's assets
and would require such investments to be made "at competitive rates of return consis-
tent with prudent investment standards." Memorandum from Harrison J. Goldin,
Comptroller of the City of New York, to Trustees of New York City Retirement
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funds' assets be invested in particular kinds of divergent
investments.38 z
None of these categories of legislative proposals addresses the ma-
jor issue raised by divergent investing. The subordination of safety
or yield to other goals has been prevented by the prudent person
standard, which is applicable to each investment decision whether or
not a state also requires a finding that the particular investment is
"legal" or authorized. 83
Abolition of the legal list in any state would not, therefore, change
the strictures of the prudent person standard. Nevertheless, we are
not opposed to repeal or modification of legal list requirements. The
strictures of the legal list create a family of problems, only one of
which is related to divergent investments. First, the legal list reduces
flexibility that the trustees of a public pension fund may desire in
order to invest in various kinds of divergent investments that cannot
be accommodated within the types of investments now on the legal
list for that fund. A number of the states that followed New York in
adopting legal lists for public pension fund investments in the early
part of this century have now dropped their legal lists as cumber-
some, inflexible and too slow to adapt to changing economic environ-
ments.3 84 New York has done the same with the investment
standards applicable to trustees of private trusts and executors and
administrators of estates.3 5 Repeal of the legal list would eliminate
Systems (Apr. 21, 1981), on file with the Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law.
This legislation is not likely to be interpreted by the courts as relaxing the prudent
person rule, because it merely adds to the legal list without clearly overriding the
pervasive prudent person standard. See supra text accompanying note 59.
382. One proposal, introduced in the 1981-82 regular session of the New York
State legislature, would have directed the trustees of New York State and City pen-
sion funds to invest at least 75% of the total amount invested each year in obligations
of the state, a municipality or a public corporation of either, in businesses licensed or
certified to do business in the state, or in mortgages on real property located in the,
state. S. 3185 (A. 4109), 1981-82 Reg. Sess. N.Y. (1981).
383. See supra text accompanying note 59.
384. E. COLTMAN & S. METZENBAUM, supra note 4, at 43. See CONGRESSIONAL
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194; R. TILOVE, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION
FUNDS 201 (1976).
385. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982)
provides in part:
A fiduciary holding funds for investment may invest the same in such securities
as would be acquired by prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such mat-
ters who are seeking a reasonable income and preservation of their capital, pro-
vided, however, that nothing in this subparagraph shall limit the effect of any
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the need for new legislation each time a new investment type is devel-
oped. Second, the legal list also reduces flexibility which may be
needed if sufficient pension fund assets are to be invested with an eye
to significant capital appreciation. Such appreciation, as we have
seen, is important for maintaining the trustees' impartiality to all par-
ticipants."' Third, as public pension fund assets continue to grow,
the limitations on types of investments and the extent of investments
in single enterprises will become increasingly restrictive, perhaps to
the point where trustees of the largest of the funds such as NYCERS
are unable to invest prudently within their terms.3" 7
Another reason the legislative proposals made so far do not facili-
tate divergent investing by public pension fund trustees is the incor-
poration of the prudent person standard into applicable federal law.
The fiduciary provisions of ERISA and PEPPRA, as proposed, fol-
low section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code in restricting trust-
ees to the pursuit of one goal only-providing retirement benefits for
participants and beneficiaries. 388  As we saw in Donovan v.
Bierwirth,389 federal courts construing these provisions of ERISA
look to state court decisions for guidance because the ERISA provi-
sions are derived from common law. A state legislature's modifica-
tion of the prudent person standard after enactment of ERISA or
PEPPRA would not necessarily change the application of the prudent
person standard under federal law.390 Furthermore, it would have no
effect upon the prohibited transaction provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code or PEPPRA.
Nevertheless, state codification of the prudent person standard
would have some utility if it tracked ERISA or PEPPRA or existing
state codifications such as the New York Insurance Regulations39' or
will, agreement, court order or other instrument creating or defining the invest-
ment powers of a fiduciary, or shall restrict the authority of a court of proper
jurisdiction to instruct the fiduciary in the interpretation or administration of the
express terms of any will, agreement or other instrument or in the administration
of the property under the fiduciary's care.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 277-82.
387. See supra note 295.
388. See supra notes 75 & 117 and text accompanying notes 226-27.
389. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), af9g 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
390. See Comment, State Domestic Relations Law and Federal Tax Policy, 66
COLUM. L. Rnv. 150 (1966).
391. See supra note 385.
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the new standard for investment by fiduciaries of private trusts. A
wholly new state effort to restate the prudent person rule, however
well drafted, probably would result in establishing an additional
layer of legal requirements for which existing law would offer mini-
mal guidance.392 Enactment of state standards modeled solely on the
ERISA/PEPPRA standard offers several advantages over using other
possible models. Unlike many little-interpreted state law provisions,
such as the Insurance Regulations, ERISA is interpreted extensively
by the courts and the Department of Labor. Because the ERISA rule
is contained in all pending versions of PEPPRA, no additional
change in investment standards would be needed if federal legislation
regulating public pension funds were enacted in its current form.
Furthermore, as we have seen, there is evidence that the Internal
Revenue Service has begun to apply the ERISA fiduciary standard to
trustees of public pension funds even in the absence of specific fed-
eral legislation to that effect,39 3 so that state enactment of the same
392. The new subdivision 7 of § 177 of the New York Retirement and Social Se-
curity Law provides an example of the confusion that may arise when each new codi-
fication of the prudent person standard is different. Enacted as part of chapter 717 of
the 1982 New York session laws, this provision establishes a five percent "basket"
within which trustees of New York State and City pension funds can make invest-
ments not otherwise on the legal list, provided:
a) that such investments by any such fund shall be made as part of a diversi-
fied investment course of conduct and that the trustee or trustees have given ap-
propriate consideration to those facts and circumstances, known or should be
known [sic], which are relevant to the investment, including the role of the in-
vestment in the investment course of conduct and the purpose of such fund;
b) that in the judgment of the trustee or trustees any such investment by any
such fund furthers the purpose of the fund and takes into consideration the risk
of loss and opportunity for gain, considering:
1) the diversification of the investments of such fund;
2) the liquidity and current return of such fund relative to the anticipated
cash flow requirements of such fund; and
3) the projected return of such investment and investment course of conduct
relative to the funding objectives of such funds.
This "standard" is a corrupt version of the Department of Labor regulations for the
ERISA fiduciary conduct standard, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2) (1982), which does
not appear to incorporate faithfully the substance of the original regulations. If the
drafters of this legislation had adopted the ERISA standard, and the state legislative
history showed the legislature's intention for that standard to be interpreted in con-
formity with the pertinent federal regulations, many ambiguities would have been
avoided.
393. Detroit Letter Ruling, 371 PENs. REP. (BNA) J-9 to J-10 (Dec. 7, 1981). See
supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
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standard may well conform state and federal fiduciary standards for
public pension funds even without enactment of PEPPRA.
If the trustees of a public pension fund desire greater flexibility in
pursuing investments that may sacrifice some degree of safety or re-
turn in order to achieve other benefits, they should secure the enact-
ment of state and federal legislation expanding their discretion by
authorizing consideration of additional investment factors. Such leg-
islation should simply authorize the trustees to make the desired class
and/or kind of investment or to consider specified factors in making
their investment decisions. Such legislation could, of course, be com-
bined with repeal of the legal list and/or codification of a prudent
person rule along the lines suggested above.
Any such state legislative proposals must be examined with possi-
ble state and federal constitutional requirements in mind. For exam-
ple, article V, section 7 of the New York State Constitution, called
the "nonimpairment clause," provides that: "[a]fter July first,
nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement
system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractural
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or im-
paired." '394 In Sgaglione v. Levitt,395 the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated a section of the New York State Financial Emergency
Act that directed the trustee of the state pension funds to purchase
specified amounts of MAC securities. The court held that the legisla-
ture may not direct investment or retention of particular assets be-
cause exercise of "prudent person" discretion by trustees is a
protected benefit under the nonimpairment clause.396 The court
posed the issue as "whether in any significant degree the. . . security
394. The Congressional Pension Task Force reported that numerous states, by
constitution, statute or case law, have characterized public pension plan interests or
the benefits promised under such plans as contractual in nature and therefore entitled
to the protection of constitutional provisions prohibiting the impairment of contracts.
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. See, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art.
XIII, § 5; Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320 (1973); Bakenhus v.
City of Seattle, 48 Wash. 2d 695, 296 P.2d 536 (1956). But cf. People ex rel. Illinois
Fed'n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 60 Ii. 2d 266, 326 N.E.2d 749 (state constitutional
protection of public employee retirement benefits does not restrict the Governor's au-
thority to reduce or veto a pension appropriation measure), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975); Village of Fairport v. Newman, - A.D.2d -, 457 N.Y.S.2d 145 (4th Dep't
1982) (public employees union may waive members' rights and negotiate reductions
in retirement benefits).
395. 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337 N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
396. Id at 512, 337 N.E.2d at 595, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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provided [the state pension systems] by reserve funds.. . will be im-
paired" by the challenged legislation.1
9 7
In dictum, however, the court acknowledged the constitutionality
of exercise of "the continuing power of the Legislature to expand or
restrict the classes and kinds of investment in which [the trustee] may
place the funds in his care," '398 a reference to the legislature's power
to establish and modify the legal list and, perhaps, its power over the
prudent person standard. Thus, Chapter 890 of the 1975 New York
session laws did not expand or contract the legal list, but authorized
the trustees to consider specified factors in addition to return and
safety in deciding whether to purchase and hold New York City and
MAC securities.399 Chapter 890 was in fact a modification of the
prudent person rule, as were the federal statutes concerning the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, Public Law 94-236 and Public Law 95-495, that
were enacted at the same time.4°
The constitutionality of this aspect of Chapter 890 under the state
nonimpairment clause has not been authoritatively decided. But its
state constitutionality has not been directly challenged or doubted by
the courts.
Chapter 890 was challenged in Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem' ° l on the grounds that it violated the due process,402 equal pro-
tection" 3 and impairment of obligation of contract4° provisions of
397. Id at 513-14, 337 N.E.2d at 596, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 84. It is unclear whether
this constitutional protection would invalidate legislation such as that proposed in
New York Senate bill 3185, which does not mandate any particular investment but
does require a large proportion of each fund's assets to be invested in a class of invest-
ments that comprise only a small portion of the fund's potential investments and that
are all more or less dependent on the economic health of one region. See supra note
382. Invalidation would be more likely in a jurisdiction that, unlike New York,
clearly requires diversification by public pension fund trustees. See supra text accom-
panying notes 283-90.
398. 37 N.Y.2d at 513, 337 N.E.2d at 595, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 84. See Tron v. Con-
dello, 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1187-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
399. See supra note 106.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07. Cf. H.R. 1507, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1983) (purports to make prudent certain employee benefit fund investments in
residential mortgages; see infra text accompanying note 408).
401. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd men, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
402. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § I. See CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 7-13; Murphy, supra note 13, at 226-27, n.52.
403. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
404. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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the United States Constitution. The court rejected each of these
claims.4°5 The due process argument was rejected on the ground that
the plaintiff participants had no property interest under state law to
which federal due process protections could attach.40 6 The equal
protection claim was rejected because the enactment of Chapter 890
was "an integral part of the financial plan to stave off the City's de-
fault" and prevention of the City's default was rationally related to
maintenance of the pension funds' solvency as well as the City's.40 7
The court rejected the argument that Chapter 890 violated the con-
tract clause of the federal constitution because the discretion of the
trustees to make the authorized purchases of securities was not im-
paired.40 8 Similar challenges to state legislation modifying the pru-
dent person standard applicable to divergent investments might
succeed if the state legislation impaired property rights vested under
state law or eliminated all protection afforded by the common law
prudent person standard or even, perhaps, if it were enacted apart
from any crisis or other circumstances of necessity.
Although enacted in exigent circumstances, Chapter 890 provides a
precedent for state legislative modification of the prudent person rule
in order to permit a particular type of divergent investment. Public
Law 94-236 provides a similar precedent for federal legislation to
modify the exclusive-benefit-of-employees requirement and prohib-
ited transaction provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.40 9 This ap-
proach also might be applied to the fiduciary provisions of PEPPRA
which should not be enacted in their present form if divergent invest-
ing is to be encouraged or even permitted.
405. See Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d at 508, 509 (synopsis of arguments before
New York Court of Appeals). Plaintiffs in this suit to invalidate a state's mandatory
investment requirement argued that it violated the federal prohibitions against legis-
lative impairment of contracts and deprivation of property without due process. The
court did not even advert to these arguments in its opinion, which invalidated the
statute under the state constitution's pension impairment prohibition. Cf. supra note
394 and text accompanying notes 394-97.
406. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. at 1261.
407. Id at 1259-60.
408. Id at 1260, following Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. at 1175, 1186-89 (§ 1(b)
of Chapter 890, which authorizes discretionary purchases of MAC and New York
City obligations by trustees of City pension funds, does not violate the federal consti-
tution as an impairment of contract). Cf. supra note 405.
409. See Pub. L. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238 (1976); supra text accompanying note 106.
See also GCM 38972, IRS POSiTiONS (CCH) 1174 (June 30, 1982).
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